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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Aeronautics-Trespass--Airplane Flight Over Another's Land.
The defendants' airplanes in landing glided at altitudes of five to
one hundred feet over the plaintiff's land. Plaintiff brought actions,
seeking both damages for trespass and an injunction against future
flights. The court held that the flight of the airplanes did not con-
stitute trespass and in the absence of actual damage no injunction would
lie.'
The ancient maxim cuius est solum, eiws est usque ad cadlum, "he
who owns the soil owns it to the sky," 2 has been generally followed and
1 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, Hinman v. United Air Lines Transport
Corp., 84 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936). The facts of the two cases are sub-
stantially the same, and both cases are disposed of on the same appeal.
3 1 Co. LITT. §4a; 2 BL COMM. 18.
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the courts have applied it in cases of shooting across land,8 the thrust-
ing of an arm across a boundary line,4 the kicking by one horse of
another through a boundary fence, 5 the extension of telephone cross-
arms over a boundary,8 the extension of wires across land,7 the projec-
tion of eaves over the boundary, s the leaning of a wall over the line,9 or
the projection of a bay window.10 These were all held to be trespasses
on the theory that any intrusion into the air space above the land of
another constituted a technical trespass.
The rapid increase in the use of the airplane has shown the ad cachm
doctrine to be inadequate to cope with the problem of determining the
relative rights of the land owner and the aviator with respect to the air
space." A strict and unqualified application of this doctrine would
seriously handicap the progress of aviation in that persons could not fly
without exposing themselves to innumerable law suits.
The English case of Pickering v. Rudd2 first mentioned the problem,
and there the court by way of dictum stated that the flight of a balloon
over another's land would be a technical trespass for which nominal
damages would be allowed.' 3 Since this early decision the English
courts have not reconsidered the problem, but a statute now prohibits
actions by a land owner against an aviator if the flights are conducted
in a reasonable and ordinary manner.14
A review of the American decisions reveals only one case'r which
would seem to give full effect to the ad caelum doctrine. There the court
held that flights at one hundred feet over the plaintiff's land constituted
trespasses for which nominal damages could be recovered.' 0
On the other hand, several theories for applying the law of trespass
'Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 241, 241 Pac. 328 (1925).
'Hannabalson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457, 90 N. W. 93 (1902).
'Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 10 (1874).
'Cumberland Teleph. and Teleg. Co. v. Barnes, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1290, 101 S. W.
301 (1907).
"Butler v. Frontier Teleg. Co., 186 N. Y. 486, 79 N. E. 716 (1906).8 Mayer v. Flynn, 46 Utah 598, 150 Pac. 962 (1915).
'Barnes v. Berendes, 139 Cal. 32, 69 Pac. 491 (1903).
"o Codman v. Evans, 5 Allen 308 (Mass. 1862).
'Thurston, Trespass to Air Space in HARvARD LEAL EssAYs (1934) 501.
'1 Stark 56 (Nisi Prius, 1815). 1 Id. at 59.
U, BarrsH Am NAVIGAVON AcT OF 1920, §9(1). "No action shall lie in respect
of trespass or in respect of nuisance, by reason only of the flight of aircraft over
any property at a height above the ground, which, in view of all the circumstances
of the case is reasonable, or the ordinary incidents of such flight, so long as the
provisions of this Act . . . are duly complied with."
' Smith v. New England Aircraft Corp., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385 (1930).
'Smith v. New England Aircraft Corp., 270 Mass. 511, 530, 170 N. E. 385, 393
(1930). "The facts show intrusion upon the land of the plaintiff by flight of air-
craft.. .. These interferences create in the ordinary mind a sense of infringement
of property rights 'which cannot be minimized or effaced. . . . Air navigation,
important as it is, cannot rightfully levy toll upon the legal rights of others for its
successful prosecution."
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to the flight of aircraft have been advanced which restrict the doctrine
of ad caelurn to a marked degree.
(1) In Swetland v. Curtis Airport Corporation17 the plaintiff
sought to enjoin flights over his land, claiming that such flights were
trespasses regardless of the height at which they were made. The court
held that a land owner has protectable property rights in the lower
stratum of air and that flights through this zone might constitute tres-
pass, but that a land owner has no such rights in the upper column of
air. This solution to the problem has been termed the "zone theory,"
and under it the scope of possible trespass is limited by that of effective
possession.' 8
(2) Also there is the "privilege theory" or "right of way theory"
which concedes to the owner of the land the owndrship of the air space
above his land to an infinite height but reserves the right of flight
through the space so long as such flights are properly conducted. 19 The
Uniform State Law for Aeronautics is consistent with this view.20
The foregoing theories, though technically distinguishable from each
other, reach substantially the same result and together constitute the
weight of authority.
- 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
'a POLLOCK, TORTS (13th ed. 1929) 362.
11 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§159, 194.
§159-"A trespass, actionable under the rule stated in §158, may be com-
mitted on, beneath, or above the surface of the earth."
§194-"An entry above the surface of the earth, in the air space in the pos-
session of another, by a person who is traveling in an aircraft, is privileged if the
flight is conducted-
(a) For the purpose of travel through the air space or for any other legitimate
purpose,(b) In a reasonable manner,
(c) At such a height as not to interfere unreasonably with the possessor's en-joyment of the surface of the land and the air space above it, and(d) In conformity with such regulations of the State and Federal aeronautical
authorities as are in force in the particular state."
The pertinent sections of the UNIFORM STATE LAW are as follows:
"Section 3. Ownership of Space. The ownership of the space above the lands
and waters of this State is declared to be vested in the several owners of the
surface beneath, subject to the right of flight described in Section 4.
"Section 4. Lawfulness of Flight. Flight in aircraft over the lands and wa-
ters of this State is lawful, unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the
then existing use to which the land or water is put by the owner, or unless so
conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the
land or water beneath. .. ." N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§191(1), 191 (m).
It is generally held that the minimum height regulations promulgated by the
Department of Commerce, under the Am COMMERcE AcT OF 1926, 44 Stat. 568
(1926), 49 U. S. C. A. §§171-184 (1934) have no effect on the right of the surface
owner either as to trespass or nuisance but are merely traffic regulations.
Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (N. D. Ohio
1929) ; (1932) 20 CALIF. L. Rav. 666; see Swetland v. Curtis Airport Corp., 55 F.
(2d) 201, 203 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
It has been held that an intrusion by an airship into the air space is not a
violation of a statute pertaining to trespass on property. Commonwealth v Nevin
and Smith, 2 Pa. D. and C. 241 (1922) ; ZOLfMAN, CASES ON Am LAW (1930) 5.
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(3) The principal cases are not determined on the basis of either of
the above theories, but rather the court seems to advance still another,
and what appears to be a more flexible doctrine, that the land owner has
property rights in the air space only to a height consistent with his actual
enjoyment and use of the land; the court stating that "the air is like the
sea in that it is capable of ownership only in so far as one may take
possession of it, utilize it and enjoy it."21
The general law of nuisance is applicable under any of the foregoing
theories, and regardless of whether the flight of planes constitutes tres-
pass, such flights may be enjoined if they create nuisances. 22
The doctrine, that travel through the air space is similar to travel on
navigable waters, enables the court in the principal cases to reach the
same result as would have Jbeen reached by applying either the "zone
theory" or the "privilege theory." But under the doctrine here presented
the invasion of the air space by aircraft in flight is not trespass at all,
rather there must be actual interference with the use and enjoyment of
the air space. While this is a very definite boon to aviation it is also
a reasonable theory for the protection of the land owner, who can re-
cover for actual injuries but not for invasions of proprietary interests
in the air space 23  JOHN TAYLOR SCHILLER.
Bills and Notes-False Impersonation.
The defendant, a clerk of court, had in his custody a sum of money
for one Y. X, an impostor and brother of Y, represented himself as Y
to the defendant, clerk of court, who believing him to be Y and without
making further inquiry, gave the impostor a check payable to his brother.
The impostor, still representing himself as his brother Y, obtained the
indorsement of plaintiff to his own false indorsement in the name of Y,
and later cashed the check at a bank. The plaintiff, indorser, having
made good the check to the bank, sued the drawer, clerk of court.
Held: Judgment for the defendant drawer. The court felt that the
plaintiff's loss was due to his own negligence in not identifying the im-
postor, and since the impostor's indorsement was a forgery he could not
transfer any property in the check.1
" Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, Hinman v. United Air Lines Transport
Corp., 84 F. (2d) 755, 758 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
22 Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934) (the flight
of airplanes over plaintiff's land stirred up a great amount of dust).
=For other treatments of the subject see Bouv6, Private Ownership of
Navigable Airspace Under the Commerce Clause (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 416;
Flagg, Airspace Ownership and the Right of Flight (1932) 3 J. AIR. L. 400;
Logan, Recent Developments in Aeronautical Law (1934) 5 J. Am L. 548; Wherry
and Condon, Air Travel and Trespass (1934) 68 U. S. L. Rrv. 78; (1934) 3
BRoo LYN L. REv. 350; (1934) 4 Damoir L. REv. 103; (1935) 6. J. Am L. 622;
(1931) 16 MINN. L. REv. 305.
'Keel v. Wynne, 210 N. C. 426, 187 S. E. 571 (1936).
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The North Carolina decision is contrary to an almost unanimous
weight of authority. The majority rule is2 that where a drawer delivers
a check to an impostor payee, believing him to be the true payee, the
impostor's later indorsement of the instrument in the name of the real
payee is regarded as a genuine indorsement in relation to the rights of
subsequent persons dealing in good faith with the instrument. The loss
must be borne 'by the drawer.
This rule is based upon two doctrines-that of "actual intent" and
of estoppel. In the former the drawee or bona fide holder is said to have
carried out the actual intent of the drawer, for in making out the check
and handing it to the physical being present, the drawer thereby pri-
marily intended to transfer the property to such person rather than to
the one named as payee on the paper, visible presence being a more cer-
tain means of identification than verbal or written designation. Thus
the drawee has paid the very person intended by the drawer to receive
payment. On the other hand, where the impersonation is accomplished
by mail, telegraph, or other indirect means of communication, the
drawer's intent is usually said to be to negotiate with the named payee
rather than with the impostor, therefore in this type of case most courts
hold the drawee liable instead of the drawer.3  There appears to be no
'United States v. Nat. Exchange Bank, 45 Fed. 163 (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1891);
Cureton v. Farmers' State Bank, 147 Ark. 312, 227 S. W. 423 (1921); Missouri
Pac. R. R. v. M. M. Cohn Co., 164 Ark. 335, 261 S. W. 895 (1924); Ryan v.
Bank of Italy Nat. Trust and Savings Ass'n, 106 Cal. App. 690, 289 Pac. 863
(1930) ; Milner v. First Nat. Bank of Waynesboro, 38 Ga. App. 668, 145 S. E.
101 (1928); Moore v. Moultrie Banking Co., 39 Ga. App. 687, 148 S. E. 311
(1929); Uriola v. Twin Falls Bank and Trust Co., 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. 1080
(1923); Famous Shoe and Clothing Co. v. Crosswhite, 124 Mo. 34, 27 S. W. 397
(1894); Hoffman v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 217, 96
N. W. 112 (1901) ; Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability Ins. Co.,
94 N. J. Law 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920); McHenry v. Old Citizens' Nat. Bank, 85
Ohio St. 203, 97 N. E. 395, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1111 (1911); Land-Title and
Trust Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 196 Pa. 230, 46 Atl. 420 (1900) ; Heavey v.
Commercial Nat. Bank, 27 Utah 222, 75 Pac. 727 (1904); Defiance Lumber Co.
v. Bank of California, 180 Wash. 533, 41 P. (2d) 135 (1935). Accord: Citizens'
Union Nat. Bank v. Terrel, 244 Ky. 16, 50 S. W. (2d) 60, 64 (1932).
Text writers explicitly state the majority view as the law of impersonation
where the instrument is given to the person present With the intent that he him-
self should receive it. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW (5th ed. 1932)
§306; 3 R. C. L. 544, 1007; 7 C. J. 686; Notes (1923) 22 A. L. R. 1230; (1928) 52
A. L. R. 1326.
Contra: Miners' and Merchants' Bank v. St. Louis Smelting and R. R., 178
S. W. 211 (Mo. 1915) ; Tolman v. American Nat. Bank, 22 R. I. 462, 48 Atl. 480
(1901); Rolling v. El Paso and S. W. Ry., 127 S. W. 302 (Tex. 1910); Simpson
v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 43 Utah 105, 134 Pac. 883 (1913) (However, the court
said here that the intent of the instant drawer 'was to give the check to the true
payee rather than to the impostor who was actually present, and thus distinguished
this case from those following the majority rule. The facts do not warrant such
a distinction.).
'(1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 76 (Where payee is fictitious, and this fact is not
known to the drawer, the drawer is not held liable.) ; (1923) 23 CoL. L. Rrv. 495;
(1923) 8 CORN. L. Q. 360; (1923) 37 HAav. L. REv. 149; (1923) 22 Micn. L. Rnv.
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real distinction between the intent in such cases. In both, the actual
condition is one of mixed or double intent. It is true that at the time
the instrument is drawn and delivered the drawer intends it for the
person present or for him with whom he has been in communication.
But at the same time, as he believes that the impostor is the real payee,
he intends the instrument for such impostor only 'because of his basic
assumption that the impostor is in fact the true payee. Therefore, the
drawer has an equal primary intention of delivering the paper to the
real payee. His intentions are thus so inseparable that to say one is
more dominant than the other is to make a purely arbitrary choice. Thus
the cases cannot reasonably be decided upon the intent theory, and the
doctrine itself resolves into a mere means of rationalization for the pur-
pose of supporting a desired result rather than being a basis for logically
reasoned decisions. It is the means to an end, not the cause of an effect. 4
The estoppel doctrine is usually invoked along with that of intent.
As between two innocent parties the one must bear the loss whose mis-
take proximately made such loss possible. The fallacy of this doctrine
is clearly shown when its application is attempted. It is claimed that
the drawer, by placing the instrument in the hands of the impostor,
thereby makes it possible for him to take advantage of innocent third
parties. This would certainly -be true if the innocent party witnessed
the actual delivery or received reliable information concerning it. But
in the majority of cases the means by which the impostor obtained the
instrument are unknown or purely conjectural to the subsequent holder
or indorser. How then reasonably can there be any substantial con-
nection between the negligence of the drawer and the later imposition
upon an innocent person, since a bare possession, nothing more appear-
ing, is not in itself sufficient indicia of ownership to protect an innocent
purchater?5 It would more logically follow that the negligence of the
acceptor or indorser in failing to identify properly the holder of the in-
61; (1923) 7 MINN. L. Rzv. 582; (1931) 5 U. oF CN. L. REV. 212. Contra:
(1900) 14 H.Av. L. REv. 60 (forgery by agent of drawer); (1932) 6 U. op CIn.
L. REv. 463.
In the "passing the buck" cases, where a drawer is not satisfied as to the
identity of a payee, and instead of giving him cash, delivers to him a check
drawn in the name of the real depositor, but the money is to be paid only when
he has properly identified himself at the bank, the courts hold the drawer not
liable. Such a result seems clearly wrong from an equitable viewpoint, since it
allows the drawer to shift wilfully the responsibility from himself to another.
Because the act of the drawer is intentional, he should be estopped from asserting
mere negligence of a subsequent cashing party. Western Union Teleg. Co,
v. Bimetallic Bank, 17 Colo. App. 229, 68 Pac. 115 (1902); Gallo v. Brooklyn Sav-
ings Bank, 199 N. Y. 222, 92 N. E. 633 (1910).
6BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW (5th ed. 1932) §467; Western
Union Teleg. Co. v. Bimetallic Bank, 17 Colo. App. 229, 68 Pac. 115 (1902);
(1924) 30 A. L. R. 1492.
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strument is the motivating cause of his own injury.6 Therefore the
doctrine of estoppel looks to be a no more satisfactory ground upon
which to base the majority holding than its supplementary ground of
"primary or actual" intent.
Our court apparently relied upon Tolman v. American National
Bank7 and Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.8 In the Tol-
man case the court held that the drawer of a check, given to an im-
postor, was not liable on the same to a bank which cashed it. The basis
for this decision was that the above holding was the common law before
it had been changed in this country -by decisions to the contrary, and that
Section 23 was intended to bring the law on this subject back to its
original status. The Rhode Island court in so holding was in error as
to the status of the common law on the subject. The cases which the
court relied upon to establish the so-called common law were not in
point. Consequently, if there was a mistake as to what the prior exist-
ing law was, the court's interpretation of the Negotiable Instruments
Law upon the basis of such law, would likewise be in error.9
Since the equities are evenly balanced, in respect to the rights of all
parties concerned in cases of false impersonation, the result reached by
the North Carolina court is probably as desirable from the equitable
standpoint as that obtained under the majority rule.1 0 The strongest
point in favor of a result holding the drawer liable where the instru-
ment is passed to the impostor personally is that such a holding has been
the prevailing rule of law over an extended period of time.
" (1932) 20 GEo. L. J. 231.
722 R. I. 462, 48 Ati. 480 (1901).8N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3003. "When a signature is forged or
made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is
wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument or to give a discharge
therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired
through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to
enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority."
'The fallacy of the Tolman Case and the inapplicability of Section 23 to false
impersonation cases where the impostor is actually present before the drawer has
been pointed out in detail. McKeehan, A Review of the Ames-Brewster Contro-
versy, 41 Am. L. REG. (N. S.) 499, 505 (1902) ; BRANNAN, THE NEGOTIABLE IN-
STRUM NTS LAW WITH COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS (1908) §128.
The fact that the impostor is liable in criminal prosecution for forgery is no
reason for holding that the instrument is to be treated as a forgery where it is
obtained with the consent of the drawer. It should be handled as a case of fraud
in a civil action. (1920) 34 HARv. L. REv. 76, 77.
The courts distinguish between a forged check, in which case the statute is
applicable, and a forged indorsement where there is an intent to transfer the
property to the impostor (even though he may not be physically present) in which
casc the statute is not controlling. Halsey v. Bank of N. Y. and Trust Co., 270
N. Y. 134, 200 N. E. 671 (1936) ; Defiance Lumber Co. v. Bank of California, 180
Wash. 533, 41 P. (2d) 135, 138 (1935).
A practical purpose might be served in the present case by holding the
clerk of court liable in that it would tend to make public officials more careful
in performing their official duties. Due to our steady increase of governmental
activity, such a result could be highly beneficial.
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A distinction might also be drawn between the situation where the
bona fide holder is an accommodation party and where he is a holder in
due course in the regular course of a business. In the latter case he is
not as free to act since he is dependent to a great extent upon the public
good-will for his livelihood and hesitates to do a thing that would make
anyone antagonistic towards him, such as being too strict about cashing
checks given in payment of sales. Generally, where practical, the courts
try to promote ease in business transactions. Such argumentative ad-
vantages would not be available to one giving no consideration. Since
the plaintiff in the present case was an accommodation indorser our
court might use this point to distinguish the case if it were considering
one where the drawee was a holder in due course.
Since the court did not mention the strong majority rule, nor an
early North Carolina case squarely in accord therewith,' and failed in
the present decision to explain clearly the basis for its result, it leaves
some doubt as to what might be done with this phase of the law of false
impersonation in the future.
W. C. HOLT.
Constitutional Law-Immunity of Federal Agency-Investigation
of Federal Agency by State Senate.
A committee appointed by the Senate of the State of Pennsylvania
to investigate the "organization, administration, and functioning of the
Works Progress Administration in Pennsylvania"' subpoenaed several
WPA officials to appear before the committee and bring with them cer-
tain official WPA records. The federal government sought to enjoin
the committeemen from proceeding with the investigation. The injunc-
tion was granted as the committee had no jurisdiction to investigate the
WPA, it being a federal agency.2
When the Works Progress Administration was established by the
President in 1935 the federal government gave official assurances to the
states that the former would care for all employables on relief rolls at
the time of the creation of WPA if the states would care for the remain-
ing unemployed. Federal moneys were allocated to administrative units
of the WPA in. each state, including Pennsylvania, and agencies were
created to disburse funds to effectuate the purposes of the act. On the
' Elliott v. Smitherman, 19 N. C. 338 (1837). The drawer of a negotiable in-
strument was held liable when he handed it to the impostor personally, and the
latter afterwards transferred it to an innocent third party.
'The Works Progress Administration was established May 6, 1935, by the
President by Executive Order No. 7034, pursuant to the authority vested in him
under the "Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935," approved April 8, 1935,
Pub. Res. No. 11, 74th Cong., 49 Stat. 115, 15 U. S. C. A. §728 note (1935).
'United States v. Owlett, 15 F. Supp. 736 (M. D. Pa. 1936).
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faith of these assurances Pennsylvania had already appropriated a sub-
stantial sum of money for unemployment relief. This appropriation
proved inadequate to serve the State's relief needs for the reason that
the WPA, allegedly, had failed to live up to its side of the bargain. At
the time of the attempted investigation the Legislature of Pennsylvania,;
at an extraordinary session in 1936, was faced with the problem of rais-
ing additional revenue for the alleviation of unemployment. The gover-
nor had demanded that the legislature impose an additional burden of
$70,000,000 on the people to provide relief for the next nine months.
The State and its local units had in the past made substantial contribu-
tions to the WPA and it was therefore materially interested in seeing
that the WPA was -being operated in a proper and efficient manner.
Furthermore, the State wanted to know if the funds which it had sup-
plied to the WPA to relieve unemployment were being expended in
the interests of a political organization. 3 Also, in order to keep down
to a minimum the increase in the tax load of an already heavily taxed
people and to legislate intelligently in regard to relief, it was necessary
for the legislature to ascertain to what extent the WPA could handle
the unemployment problem. These motives, among others, seem to
justify the attempted investigation. It is not difficult to see that a state
would be reluctant to relinquish all control over funds contributed to
the WPA.4  Moreover, it seems that the State should be entitled to
know how its funds and those of its municipal subdivisions, contributed
to particular WPA projects, were being expended. Therefore, one
wonders why an investigation of this character, if bona fide, should be
denied the State.5
When a legislative body has occasion to acquire certain knowledge
of facts pertaining to proper subjects of legislation, either branch of the
legislative body, or one of its committees, has the power to summon
persons to attend as witnesses any meeting which it has the power to
'By the WPA General Letter No. 8, March 13, 1936, sent to all State Works
Progress Administrators, the Federal Administrator, Harry L. Hopkins, made it
corvincingly clear that the WPA was not to be operated for the political inter-
ests of any group.
'State participation in the WPA program is wholly voluntary. The situation
is analagous to that which arose under the so-called "Maternity Act," which pro-
vided for federal appropriations to be apportioned among those states which vol-
untarily complied with its provisions for the purpose of coiperating with the
states to reduce maternal and infant mortality. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 67 L. ed. 1078 (1923).
Upon reading the reply affidavits submitted by the Senate committee (which
were rejected by the court) one is convinced that John Q. Public would gladly
have welcomed a general WPA expos& The State's case was weakened by the
fact that the Senate committee was informed by letter that -the WPA was pre-
pared to co~perate with the State and to supply legislative bodies thereof with
such information as might have been necessary to assist them properly to design
measures to meet their relief requirements.
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hold, and, if the person so summoned wilfully fails to appear, he may
be punished for contempt.6 The investigatory power of a legislative
body is limited to obtaining information on matters which fall within its
proper field of legislation. 7
However, it is well established that a federal instrumentality is im-
mune from state control. 8 This principle of immunity applies to official
papers and records of the federal government,9 and prevents a state
from obstructing or interfering with employees of the United States in
the discharge of their official duties.10 It was admitted that the WPA
was a federal agency; hence, the Legislature of Pennsylvania could
neither pass legislation dealing directly with the WPA nor investigate
in a manner which would interfere with its administration. Therefore,
to the extent that subpoenaing the employees of the Works Progress
Administration and demanding the production of records would obstruct
the operation of that federal agency, injunctive relief was proper." But
the court in the principal case decreed that the respondents be restrained
from "conducting any investigation" into the Works Progress Adminis-
tration. It is not difficult to conceive an inquiry initiated by a state
in order to guide the legislative body in the consideration of legislation
properly before it, without the aid of employees or official records of
the Works Progress Administration, that would in no way interfere
with the federal agency. Hence, the court's decree is broader than was
absolutely necessary to protect the federal government. The blanket
injunction completely guarded the WPA from the spotlight of any
state legislative investigation.' 2
E. C. SANDERSON.
6McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 47 Sup. Ct. 319, 71 L. ed. 580 (1927);
Ex pare Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 277 Pac. 725 (1929) ;,In re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155,
32 Pac. 470, 948 (1893) ; Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray 226 (Mass. 1859) ; E
parte Parker, 74'S. C. 466, 55 S. E. 122 (1906).
7 People v. Keeler, 99 N. Y. 463, 2 N. E. 615 (1885) ; Commonwealth v. Cos-
tello, 21 Pa. Dist. R. 232 (1912).
'Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. ed. 1022 (U. S. 1842); United
States v. Tarble, 13 Wall. 397, 20 L. ed. 597 (U. S. 1871) ; Tennessee v. Davis, 100
U. S. 257, 25 L. ed. 648 (1879) ; Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117 U. S.
151, 6 Sup. Ct. 670, 29 L. ed. 845 (1885) ; Flaherty v. Hanson, 215 U. S. 515, 30
Sup. Ct. 179, 54 L. ed. 307 (1910).
' Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459, 20 Sup. Ct. 701, 44 L. ed. 846 (1900);
Ex parte Sackett, 74 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 326
(1905).
"Osborne v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738, 6 L. ed. 204 (U. S. 1824) ; Stray-
horn, The Immunity of Federal Officers from State Pr-osecutions (1928) 6 N. C.
L. Ray. 123.
" See In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. ed. 1092 (1895).
" Had the problem been considered as a purely political one the court might
have refused to intervene. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. ed. 581 (U. S. 1849) ;
Pacific States Teleph. and Teleg. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118, 32 Sup. Ct. 224,
56 L. ed. 377 (1912). See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 483, 43 Sup. Ct.
597, 599, 67 L. ed. 1078, 1083 (1923).
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Contracts-Effect of Death of Promisor.
A share-cropper died before commencing performance of his con-
tract with defendant. Plaintiff, widow and administratrix of the de-
ceased, requested defendant to furnish the necessary supplies and per-
mit the two minor sons of the cropper to perform the contractual ob-
ligations. On defendant's refusal she sued for the full value of the
cropper's share in the unmade crop. Recovery was denied.1
As to the effect of death of one party to a contract, the rules of
law are of long standing. Where the contract is not personal in nature,
the obligations survive the death of either party.2 And where the
agreement is personal in nature, the death of either promisor generally
excuses both parties from further obligation.3 Acceptance of these
rules has been quite uniform. In application, however, there is less
unanimity of opinion, because of the lack of an adequate standard for
determining what contracts are, or are not, personal in nature.4 A
contract to render services as an attorney,5 or to manage an inven-
tion,6 or a drug store,7 or to act as busines manager of a band,3 or to
care for and support another 9 has been held to be terminated by the
death of either party. The following types of contracts have been
'Taylor v. Rainwater, 187 S. E. 704 (Ga. 1936).2 Dumont v. Heighton, 14 Ariz. 25, 123 Pac. 306 (1912); Mackey' v. Clark
Rig. Bldg. Co., 5 Cal. App. (2d) 44, 42 P. (2d) 341 (1935); Toland, Adm'r v.
Stevenson, 59 Ind. 485 (1887); Burch v. Bush, 181 N. C. 125, 106 S. E. 489
(1921); Hall v. Durham Loan and Trust Co., 200 N. C. 734, 158 S. E. 388
(1931); In re Troutwine's Estate, 178 AtI. 302 (Pa. 1935) ; Edelen Transfer and
Storage Co. v. Willis, 16 Tenn. App. 99, 66 S. W'. (2d) 214 (1932); Volk v.
Stowell, 98 Wis. 385, 74 N. W. 118 (1898).
'Givhan v. Dailey's Adm'x, 4 Ala. 336 (1842) ; Herren v. Harris, Cortner and
Co., 201 Ala. 577, 78 So. 921 (1918); Smith v. Preston, 170 Ill. 179, 48 N. E.
688 (1897); Campbell v. Faxon, Horton and Gallagher, 73 Kan. 675, 85 Pac.
760, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1002 (1906) ; Marvel v. Phillips, 162 Mass. 399, 38 N. E.
1117 (1894); Donlan v. City of Boston, 223 Mass. 285, 111 N. E. 718 (1916);
Lacy v. Getman, 119 N. Y. 109, 23 N. E. 452 (1890); Rubin v. Siegel, 188 App.
Div. 636, 177 N. Y. Supp. 342 (1919) ; Siler v. Gray, 86 N. C. 566 (1882) ; Fol-
quet v. Woodburn Public Schools, 146 Ore. 339, 29 P. (2d) 554 (1934) ; Blakeley
v. Sousa, 197 Pa. 305, 47 AtI. 286 (1900).
' Stacy, C. J., in Burch v. Bush, 181 N. C. 125, 127, 106 S. E. 489, 490 (1921),
stated, "The line of demarcation between a personal contract, which is terminated
by death, and one which the personal representatives of the deceased are required
to fulfill is not very clearly defined. The reasons for this become obvious and
apparent upon a moment's reflection. Two elements which enter into the making
of a contract, namely, the intention and understanding of the parties, are not sub-
ject to any fixed standard of 'weights and measures.' They are invisible and in-
tangible things, variable with time and place, and undeterminable by any constant
or set formula. Hence, no hard and fast rule can be established for their ascer-
tainment."
'Clifton v. Clark, Hood and Co., 83 Miss. 446, 36 So. 251 (1904) ; Sargent v.
McLeod, 209 N. Y. 360, 103 N. E. 164, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 380 (1913).
'Marvel v. Phillips, 162 Mass. 399, 38 N. E. 1117 (1894).
7 Campbell v. Faxon, Horton and Gallagher, 73 Kan. 675, 85 Pac. 760, 5 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1002 (1906).8 Blakeley v. Sousa, 197 Pa. 305, 47 At. 286 (1900).
Siler v. Gray, 86 N. C. 566 (1882).
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held to survive the death of either party: a contract of tenancy,10
a contract to repeair, 11 to take a certain amount of water for a fixed
term,' 2 to erect a building.'8 Thus, since the problem is one of inter-
pretation, it is to be suspected that the decisions are often influenced by
what the court considers the better policy.
The confusion in the cases centers around the rule that the death of
either party to a personal contract generally excuses both parties from
further performance. If the obligations are personal as to both par-
ties, and they frequently are, the death of either should dissolve the con-
tract. Where the obligations of the deceased party alone are personal,
the contract is properly held to have been terminated by death.14 The
chief difficulty arises in those cases in which the duties of the surviv-
ing party are personal, and those of the deceased are not. In the com-
paratively small number of cases in which this issue is directly involved
perhaps the greater number hold that a contract personal as to one
party is necessarily so as to the other.15 The more sensible point of
view is taken by a small minority.16 This latter group has been ably
supported by Professor Williston.17 These courts consider the obliga-
" Alsup v. Banks, 68 Miss. 664, 9 So. 895, 13 L. R. A. 598 (1891) ; Becker v.
Walworth, 45 Ohio St. 169, 12 N. E. 1 (1877).
' Chamberlain v. Dunlop, 126 N. Y. 45, 26 N. E. 966 (1891).
"Drummond v. Crane, 159 Mass. 577, 35 N. E. 90, 23 L. R. A. 707 (1893).
' MacDonald v. O'Shea, 58 Wash. 169, 108 Pac. 436, Ann. Cas. 1912A 420
(1910).
" Givhan v. Dailey's Adm'x, 4 Ala. 336 (1842); Smith v. Preston, 170 Ill.
179, 48 N. E. 688 (1897); Marvel v. Phillips, 162 Mass. 399, 38 N. E. 1117
(1894) ; Donlan v. City of Boston, 223 Mass. 285, 111 N. E. 718 (1916); Folquet
v. Woodburn Public Schools, 146 Ore. 339, 29 P. (2d) 554 (1934).
-" Campbell v. Faxon, Horton and Gallagher, 73 Kan. 675, 85 Pac. 760, 5 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1002 (1905); Harrison v. Conlan, 92 Mass. 85 (1865); Homan v.
Redick, 97 Neb. 299, 149 N. W. 782 (1914); Lacy v. Getman, 119 N. Y. 109, 23
N. E. 452 (1890); Arming v. Steinway, 35 Misc. Rep. 220, 71 N. Y. Supp. 810
(1901) ; Kenny v. Doherty, 230 N. Y. 44, 129 N. E. 201 (1920) ; Casto v. Murray,
47 Ore. 57, 81 Pac. 883 (1905); Yerrington v. Green and Another, 7 R. I. 589
(1863).
In Toland, Adm'r v. Stevenson, 59 Ind. 485 (1877), the estate of the deceased
employer was held liable for services performed after his death. The court then
added that if the plaintiff had died before the completion of the contract, his death
would probably have discharged it, because the services, which perhaps required
personal skill, could not have been performed by his executor. 3 WILLISTO ,
CONTRACTS (1st ed. 1924) §1941; RESTATEmENT, CoNTRAcTS (1932) §459, illust.
11; (1930) 6 IND. L. J. 122; Kelly v. Thompson Land Co., 112 W. Va. 454, 164
S. E. 667 (1932). Other cases bearing on this view are Hughes v. Cross, 166
Mass. 61, 43 N. E. 1031 (1896) ; Barnett v. Towne, 196 Mass. 487, 82 N. E. 698
(1907); Pugh v. Baker, 127 N. C. 2, 37 S. E 82 (1900); Hall v. Durham Loan
and Trust Co., 200 N. C. 734, 158 S. E. 388 (1931); Volk v. Stowell, 98 Wis.
385, 74 N. W. 118 (1898).
1 "The assumption frequently made in the cases that because the contract of
the employee is personal, that of the employer necessarily must be, seems wholly
unfounded. There is no necessity logical or legal for both the promises in a bi-
lateral contract to be personal in character because one is. The promise of a
painter to. paint a landscape is discharged by his physical inability to paint, but
the death or illness of one who has contracted to buy the painting will not free his
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tions of both parties to the contract. If they find that the personal
representatives of the deceased party could perform the contract as
well as could the deceased, the agreement is held to survive.
Even though a contract is not personal in its nature, the parties
may, by express stipulation, exclude substituted performance. The
death of either would, of course, then terminate the agreement.18
But where the contract, personal by nature, contains an express provi-
sion that it is to be binding upon the personal representatives of either
of the parties, the death of one of the parties thereto has been held
to discharge the agreement.' 9
The decisions in North Carolina approve, in general, the afore-
mentioned rules. But the agreement survives if the obligations of the
deceased party are not of a personal nature. Thus the North Caro-
lina court has in effect, though not expressly, followed the argument of
Professor Williston. For example, in the recent case of Hall v. Dur-
ham Loan and Trust Co.,20 an employer's estate was held liable for a
clerk's salary accruing after the death of the employer, the court
stating that the contract was not personal on the part of the deceased.
The same point of view has been expressed in other cases.
2
'
In the principal case, though it should have done so, the court did
not base its decision upon whether or not the contract was personal in
nature. Instead, the following factors were considered decisive: the
fact that the cropper could not show full performance, that his illness
estate from liability. Similarly in contracts of employment the nature of the em-
ployer's undertaking should be considered in each case. If the character of the
employment was such that the employer had free power to delegate the oversight
of the work to another and no personal co6peration on his part is needed for the
proper fulfilment of the contract, there seems no reason why his death should
affect the continued obligation of the contract." 3 WmLIs'roN, CONTRACTS (1st
ed. 1924) §1941.
" See Schultz and Co. v. Johnson's Adm'r, 44 Ky. 497, 501 (1845) ; Cox v. Mar-
tin, 75 Miss. 229, 239, 21 So. 611, 613 (1897) ; Siler v. Gray, 86 N. C. 566, 570(1882).
"a Marvel v. Phillips, 162 Mass. 399, 38 N. E. 1117 (1894) ; Browne v. Fairhall,
213 Mass. 290, 100 N. E. 556, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 349 (1913) ; Cutler v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 274 Mass. 341, 174 N. E. 507 (1931) ; Homan v. Redick,
97 Neb. 299, 149 N. W. 782 (1914); cf. In re McIntosh's Estate, 182 Iowa 23,
159 N. W. 223 (1916).
200 N. C. 734, 158 S. E. 388 (1931) (plaintiff was clerk in a tobacco ware-
house).
2LIn Pugh v. Baker, 127 N. C. 2, 37 S. E. 82 (1900), a farm laborer, having
performed -his contract in part after his employer's death, sued the employer's
estate for wages. The court did not mention the personal or non-personal nature
of the agreement, but based its decision merely upon the ground that the contract
survived the death of the employer. That the contract was not personal as to the
deceased would seem to be implicit in the decision. In the case of Burch v. Bush,
181 N. C. 125, 106 S. E. 489 (1921), the court held that a contract to cut timber
and manufacture it into lumber was not personal in its nature and survived the
death of the promisor, as such seemed to be the intentions of the parties. See also
Siler v. Gray, 86 N. C. 566 (1882).
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and death afforded no legal excuse for nonperformance, and that the
defendant landlord, in refusing to allow the cropper's sons to perform,
had not committed a breach. Had the contract been treated as not
personal, its obligations would have survived. Then a refusal by de-
fendant to allow the personal representatives to perform would have
constituted a breach. Thus the questions of full performance and
nonperformance would have been irrelevant. But if the contract had
been deemed personal, death of the cropper would have discharged it.
Then defendant's refusal to permit the children to perform would
not have been a breach. Here, likewise, the questions of full perform-
ance and nonperformance would not have been relevant. However,
ample justification for the actual decision probably may be found in
the many personal factors that influence the making of a contract be-
tween a landlord and his share-cropper.2 2 Apparently in the instant
case the court was influenced by the personal nature of the agreement.
To have articulated this point would have clarified its cloudy and un-
certain manner of reasoning. C. M. IVEY, JR.
Contracts-Gold Clause.
Under the terms of a lease made in 1890, lessee agreed to pay
139,320 grains of pure-gold quarter-yearly, or at the lessor's option
$6,000 in currency. Until December, 1933, the lessor accepted currency
payments under the option. In that month, however, he notified the lessee
to deliver gold or to pay $10,158.75 in currency, the alleged market value
of the gold at the time. Lessee made five payments of this amount,
protesting each time the excess above $6,000 and finally in February
1935 demanded a refund. Thereupon the lessor notified the lessee to
deliver gold bullion in London or vacate. The lessee brought this ac-
tion for relief, claiming the right to pay $6,000, and asking that the
lessor be enjoined from attempting to collect more than this amount
and from demanding gold. The court rejected the contention of the
lessee that since Congress had declared gold clauses illegal,1 lessee
could perform under the alternative provision for currency regardless
of the lessor's option. The court further held that the Joint Resolu-
tion of June 5, 1933, declaring gold clauses illegal did not apply to the
contract before it which was a commodity and not a money contract.
' In Pope v. Dickerson, 205 Ala. 594, 595, 89 So. 24, 25 (1921), the court
stated, "The contract -was therefore based upon a personal trust in the skill and
competency of the intestate as a farmer, and it was fatally breached by his early
and complete physical disability by reason of a chronic dropsy, to discharge his
obligations under the contract. This disability withdrew from him that personal
superintendence of the preparation of the soil and the planting and cultivation of
the crops which was necessary for success and mutual profit. . . ." Cf. California
Packing Corp. v. Lopez, 207 Cal. 600, 279 Pac. 664, 64 A. L. R. 1418 (1929).
148 Stat. 113 (June 5, 1933), 31 U. S. C. A. §463 (Supp. 1935).
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The lessee was ordered to pay and the lessor to accept $10,158.75
quarterly.2
The contention of the court that the contract involved was one which
called for payment in gold as a commodity seems to rest on a firm
legal foundation.3 The use of gold or silver clauses in leases, notes,
and other contracts is not rare in business nor controversy concerning
them unusual in law.4 Very few of these are gold bullion contracts.
The cases, without exception, have held, or said by dictum, that gold
bullion and gold dust are commodities and not money.5 This view
has been acquiesced in by legal writers0 and legislators.7  But in spite
of this weight of authority the case is not as simple as the learned
Judge held it to be.8 The difficulty arises when we consider the pur-
poses of the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, and the true nature of
the gold clause whether it be for gold dollars of a given weight and
fineness or for bullion or dust.
'Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 15 Fed. Supp. 938 (W. D.
Mo. 1936).
' The other aspects of the case are not considered in tfiis comment.
' See Note (1895) 29 L. R. A. 512 for an extensive treatment of cases involving
various types of gold or silver obligations.
'Essex Co. v. Pacific Mills, 14 Allen 389, 396 (Mass. 1867). "The contract
by which the defendant engaged to deliver two hundred and sixty ounces of silver,
of a specified fineness . .. , was a contract for the delivery of a commodity, and
not for the payment of money. The alternative which it allowed, to pay or de-
liver an equivalent in gold was not adopted; and if it had been, it merely provided
for the substitution of another commodity." Bank of Commonwealth v. Van
Vleck, 49 Barb. 508, 522 (N. Y. 1867). "Therefore, . . . when a person promises
for any valid consideration to return gold or silver, instead of the national cur-
rency, he is bound to return those specific things, precisely as he would be bound
to return a specific quantity and quality of cotton. . . . There can be no possible
difference." Roberts v. Smith, 58 Vt. 492, 494, 4 AtI. 709, 710 (1886). In hold-
ing a note payable in bullion to be non-negotiable the court said: "The instrument
declared upon was not even a promise to pay a given sum in specific articles, but
only to pay 'one ounce of gold'. It stands for consideration as though it were a
promise to pay one bushel of wheat." In discussing a gold coin contract the U. S.
Supreme Court recently distinguished these holdings. Norman v. B. and 0. R R.,
294 U. S. 240, 302, 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 413, 79 L. ed. 885, 899 (1934). "We are of
the opinion that the gold clauses now before us were not contracts for payment in
gold coin as a commodity, or in bullion, but were contracts for the payment of
money."
Even in considering the Gold Clause Cases, bullion has been thought of as
excepted. John P. Dawson, Tti Gold Clause Decisions (1935) 33 MIcH. L. RE-V.
647, 669. "Contracts for delivery of a specified quantity of gold bullion (in other
words contracts dealing with gold as a commodity) would clearly fall outside the
scope of the resolution."
7 Illustrative of this are the debates in Congress on gold legislation in the
spring of 1933. 77 CONG. Rtc. 4902 (1933). "Mr. Fletcher-A dollar is a dollar
under the decree of the Government whether it has one gold content or another.
Let us keep away from commodity contracts. They throw no light on the issue
here." Id. at 1894. "Mr. Connally-I might suggest that when a debtor and a
creditor make a contract with reference to money-I am not now speaking of
bullion contracts; I am speaking of contracts calling for dollars-. ."
I Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 15 Fed. Supp. 938, 946 (W.
D. Mo. 1936). "Perhaps it was unnecessary to have written so much concerning
this simple case. It is a simple case."
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In the three Gold Clause cases9 the U. S. Supreme Court held that
the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, was constitutional. One pur-
pose of the legislation was to prevent gold clause creditors from reap-
ing unearned benefits from the devaluation of the dollar and thereby
embarrassing Congress in the exercise of its powers over money.10
If gold bullion contracts are made an exception to the law, it would
seem that this purpose could easily be defeated as to all future con-
tracts," 12 and the Resolution rendered in future effect a nullity. The
question upon which the case should depend is whether a gold bullion
contract can be brought within the class of obligations "payable in money
of the United States."' 3 14
To do this, two things are necessary: first to recognize that the real
purpose of the gold clause is not to insure the delivery of a commodity
-gold-but to protect the creditor against unfavorable fluctuations in
the value of currency;15 and second to give judicial sanction to the
economic fact that gold is money. 16 Gold whether coined or uncoined
' Norman v. B. and 0. R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 55 Sup. Ct. 407, 79 L. ed. 885
(1934) ; Nortz v. U. S., 294 U. S. 317, 55 Sup. Ct. 428, 79 L. ed, 907 (1934) ;
Perry v. U. S., 294 U. S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 432, 79 L. ed. 912 (1934). These cases
involved the more usual types of gold clauses, i.e. those calling for a sum of
money in gold.
U. S. Cox'sT. Art. I, §8. John P. Dawson, The Gold Clause Decisions (1935)
33 MicH. L. REv. 647, 676. "The value of gold has been deliberately and arti-
ficially raised by the Government, in the course of a concerted effort to induce a
general rise in prices .... The gain to creditors would represent an increment owed
not to their own industry or to an equivalent value contributed by them, but to
governmental action undertaken in the public interest."
' That Congress did intend its effect to extend into the future is made clear
in the Resolution itself: "Every obligation heretofore or hereafter incurred ......
48 Stat. 113(a) (June 5, 1933), 31 U. S. C. A. §463(a) (Supp. 1935).
There is, of course, the additional consideration of undue hardship on a few
debtors when others are being relieved. However, in accepting the lease on those
terms, the lessee knew that it was accepting a different and perhaps harder con-
tract than was usual.
'-48 Stat. 113 (June 5, 1933), 31 U. S. C. A. §463(b) (Supp. 1935). "As used
in this resolution the term obligation means an obligation (including every obliga-
tion of and to the United States, excepting currency) payable in money of the
United States."
"1 (1936) 22 WAsH. UNiv. L. Q. 124 suggests that the case should have been
controlled by the consideration that since the Government would confiscate gold if
it were paid and allow the lessor only $6,000 in currency in return, therefore the
real equivalent of the gold is that amount. This, however, would not bring gold
bullion contracts within the scope of the Joint Resolution which, it is submitted,
would be a more desirable result.
'Post and Willard, Power of Congress to Nullify Gold Clauses (1933) 46
HAav. L. Ray. 1225, 1239. "This construction gives to the contract the primary
effect the parties intended which is to protect the creditor against fluctuations in
the value of money. The Supreme Court has recognized this to be the primary
purpose of the gold clause. What the creditor wants is not gold coin but gold
value."
" 18 R. C. L. 1266, 1267. "It (money) is a generic term and covers everything
which by common consent represents property, and passes as such currently from
hand to hand, whether it be ...the gold and silver of the world or the paper
money of modern Europe and America." The confusion which results from the
close identity of gold and money is well illustrated by two decisions of the Supreme
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not only is the basis of our monetary system, but before 1933 circu-
lated to some extent in both forms as money. "The almost universal
use of gold as a standard of value in international transactions im-
presses it to a peculiar degree with the quality of money. The power
to maintain the parity of all kinds of U. S. currency would need only
a slight extension to include this regulation of parity with gold bullion,
the basic international standard."' 17 By recognizing judicially the
peculiar monetary quality of gold it is possible to bring gold bullion
contracts, which are truly value and not commodity obligations, within
the scope of the Joint Resolution, thus relieving the few bullion debtors
of their excessive burdens and making it unnecessary for Congress to
enact further legislation to protect its monetary policy from such con-
tracts. JAMES W. DORsEY.
Insolvency-Receivership-Types of Insolvency.
Plaintiffs brought suit in a Pennsylvania state court against the
Conneaut Lake Company for services performed. While suit was in
progress a simple contract creditor of the Lake Company filed a bill in
a federal district court praying that a receiver be appointed for
the company. The bill alleged that the company was unable to meet
the claims of creditors. The company admitted this allegation and
consented to the appointment. Defendant was named receiver.1 Plain-
tiffs subsequently had judgment in their action in the state court.2 They
petitioned the district court for leave to issue execution on this judg-
ment, asking that the receiver's appointment be declared void for want
of jurisdiction because the bill upon which it was made did not allege
that the Lake Company was insolvent. Held: though the figures in the
bill showed assets in excess of liabilities the appointment was proper.
A corporation unable to pay its current obligations is insolvent in the
equitable sense, and an allegation of such insolvency is sufficient for the
purpose of appointment of a receiver.3
Court of the U. S. In Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229, 250, 19 L. ed. 141, 146
(U. S. 1868) it said: "A contract to pay a certain number of dollars in gold or
silver coins is, therefore, in legal import nothing else than an agreement to deliver
a certain weight of standard gold, to be ascertained by a count of coins. . . . It
is not distinguishable, as we think, in principle from a contract to deliver an equal
weight of bullion." Again in Gay v. U. S., 13 Wall. 358, 20 L. ed. 606 (U. S.
1871) the court held that gold coins were articles of commerce and therefore
commodities.
27John P. Dawson, The Gold Claue Decisions (1935) 33 MIcH. L. REv. 647,
678.
1Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Hirsch, 65 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
'Ketchum v. Conneaut Lake Co., 309 Pa. St. 224, 163 Atl. 534 (1932).
3Ketchum v. McDonald, 85 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936). The bill further
alleged that a receiver was necessary to preserve the property as a unit to sustain
its value and prevent loss to creditors.
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"Insolvency" has two meanings: (1) insufficiency of assets, at a
fair valuation, to pay all outstanding obligations, and (2) inability to
meet obligations as they mature in the usual course of business. Such
inability might exist although the value of the assets greatly exceed the
amount of liabilities; for instance, the assets might not be readily salable.
The first is the definition adopted by the National Bankruptcy Act,4 and
is in accord with popular understanding. In fields of law other than
bankruptcy the second is frequently used, especially in equity, and is
embodied in the Uniform Sales Act.5 In determining solvency or in-
solvency as a ground for the appointment of a receiver, however, equity
has employed neither definition to the exclusion of the other,0 occasion-
ally using (1), 7 more often (2), s sometimes both. 9  Few cases arise in
which (1) is asserted as the sole type of insolvency. Creditors have
no reason to complain so long as their claims are being met, and stock-
holders are hopeful that the corporation will work its way out of diffi-
culty, or are disinterested because they have no expectancy of sharing
in any surplus resulting from liquidation. In those cases purporting to
apply (1) alone in appointing a receiver (2) is usually present also,
though the latter may remain undiscussed. 10 Courts hesitate to liq-
uidate a corporation paying its debts as they mature notwithstanding the
fact that its assets are less than its liabilities. Where both conditions
obtain a decree of insolvency seems unavoidable.
There is usually room for doubt in determining when a corporation
should be declared insolvent by definition (2)."1 The claims allegedly
435 Stat. 838 (1909), 11 U. S. C. A. §1 (1927).
rU. S. A. §76.
'Sill v. Kentucky Coal and Timber Development Co., 11 Del. Ch. 93, 97 Atl.
617 (1916).
1 Nowell v. International Trust Co., 169 F. 497 (C. C. A. 9th, 1909) ; Parsons
v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 4 N. J. Eq. 187 (1842); Wood and Nathan Co. v. American
Machine and Mfg. Co., 62 Atl. 768 (N. J. Eq. 1908).
8Atwater v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 152 Ill. 605, 38 N. E. 1017 (1893);
Merriman and Wasson Co. v. Eagle Pencil Co., 199 N. E. 243 (Ind. 1936); Uhl
v. Wexford Co., 275 Mich. 712, 267 N. W. 775 (1936); Dep't Store Co. v.
Gaus-Langenberg Hat Co., 17 N. M. 112, 125 Pac. 614 (1912); Illinois Refining
Co. v. Illinois Oil Co., 130 Okla. 27, 264 Pac. 904 (1928); Davis v. Consolidated
Coal Co., 41 Wash. 480, 84 Pac. 22 (1906).
'Whitmer v. Win. Whitmer and Sons, 11 Del. Ch. 222, 99 At!. 428 (1916);
Shaw v. Standard Piano Co., 86 N. J. Eq. 137, 97 At. 281 (1916).
"0It is not enough that assets are less than liabilities if the corporation "be
still prosecuting its line of business, 'with reasonable prospect and expectation of
continuing to do so; in other words, if it be in good faith what is called a going
business." Corey v. Wadsworth, 99 Ala. 68, 78, 11 So. 350, 353 (1892) ; see Kynerd
v. McCarthy, 3 F. (2d) 32, 33 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924) ; Parsons v. Monroe Mfg. Co.,
4 N. J. Eq. 187 (1842) (test 1 was applied, -but (2) was present).
n "Insolvency is not always a fact to be ascertained by simple arithmetic, leav-
ing no room for doubt or difference of opinion. It is very rarely indeed that the
financial situation of a corporation is so clearly defined that it continues solvent
up to a given instant, and is immediately thereafter insolvent. In almost all such
cases there is a period of struggle during which effort is made to rescue the enter-
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unpaid may be in dispute.12 The funds of the corporation may be
ample to meet maturing claims, but rendered unavailable by a foreign
receivership, instituted on other grounds. 13 The corporation may be
able to pay current expenses, but only by borrowing money,14 or by
drawing on the individual resources of the directors.' 5 The number of
situations which may arise under varying commercial conditions and in
different kinds of business make formulation of definite rules impos-
sible. Circumstances constituting insolvency for one corporation may
be considered only temporary financial embarrassment for another. 16
The real question to be determined is whether there is a reasonable pros-
pect that the business may be continued successfully and the creditors
ultimately satisfied.17 Naturally the courts are more prone to declare
insolvent a corporation which has ceased to do business than one still
actively trying to carry out the purpose for which it was organized.' 8
The mere willingness of the corporation to be adjudged insolvent may
influence the court to decree accordingly, even in cases where the oppo-
prise from threatened insolvency." Coffman v. Maryland Publishing Co., 167 Md.
275, 284, 173 At. 248, 252 (1934) ; see 15 FLETCHER ON CORPORATIONS* (Rev. ed.
1932) §7360.
2 If the dispute is serious, and it appears to the equity judge that the claim is
thereby rendered doubtful, it should not be considered. McKee v. Standard Min-
erals Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 97, 156 At. 193 (1931). If insolvency is determined on
the basis of disputed claims, and claims are later disallowed by the receiver, the
rejection will defeat the decree upon which appointment was made. Manning v.
Middle States Oil Co., 11 Del. Ch. 93, 137 Atl. 79 (1927). In Illinois Refining
Co. v. Illinois Oil Co., 130 Okla. 27, 264 Pac. 904 (1928) appointment was made
on bill of non-judgment creditor whose claim was being disputed in another action,
and subsequently was defeated in entirety. Illinois Oil Cb. v. Illinois Refining
Co., 12 P. (2d) 535 (Okla. 1932).
That officers are unable to disburse assets does not render -the corporation
insolvent, for creditors can present their claims to the receiver in foreign juris-
diction. Bruch v. National Guarantee Credit Corp., 13 Del. Ch. 180, 116 Atl. 738
(1922).
" The fact that debtor borrows money to pay obligations does not -prevent a
finding of insolvency, but such borrowing is consistent with solvency, since it shows
that debtor still has credit. Coffman v. Maryland Publishing Co., 167 Md. 275,
173 Atl. 248 (1934) ; Catlin v. Vichachi Mining Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 286, 67 AtL. 194
(1907); cf. Cassels Mills v. First Nat. Bank of Gadsden, 187 Ala. 325, 65 So. 820
(1914); see Alpha Hardware and Supply Co. v. Ruby Mines Co., 97 Cal. 508, 275
Pac. 984 (1929) ; Menager v. Exchange Nat. Bank, 159 Okla. 278, 15 P. (2d) 35
(1932).
" A bank dependent upon the individual resources of its directors for payment
of its debts, is insolvent. Oakley v. Paterson Bank, 2 N. J. Eq. 173 (1839).
" Though unable to pay its debts immediately, a corporation may not be in-
solvent if its assets will shortly become more valuable and salable by reason of
nearby improvements. Brenton and McKay v. Peck, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 224, 87
S. W. 898 (1905).
- Corey v. Wadsworth, 99 Ala. 68, 11 So. 350 (1892) ; Whitmer v. Win. Whit-
mer and Sons, 11 Del. Ch. 222, 99 At. 428 (1916) ; Cook v. East Trenton Pottery
Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 29, 30 Atl. 534 (1894).
' Chisolm v. Carolina Agency Co., 88 S. C. 438, 70 S. E. 1035 (1911); see
Cook v. East Trenton Pottery Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 29, 30 Atl. 534 (1894).
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site result might have appeared equitable. 19 This approach is reflected
in state statutes authorizing appointment of equity receivers in cases
where a corporation is insolvent, or has suspended business for want of
sufficient funds to continue operations, and it does not appear that busi-
ness may shortly be resumed without prejudice to creditors and stock-
holders.20
With attention focused upon the desirability of continuing or dis-
continuing the corporation, courts not infrequently lose sight of the
consequences of the particular type of insolvency then before them.
Appointments are sometimes made upon petition of a stockholder where
both types of insolvency are present, and the petitioner is therefore
without equitable interest in the resultant liquidation. 21 Only where
the insolvency is of type (2), and there is reason to believe that some
surplus will remain after payment of creditors should a stockholder be
entitled to institute a receivership. 22 This laxity in scrutinizing the
equitable standing of the plaintiff is further illustrated by consent ap-
pointments on bills of non-judgment creditors.23 Often appointments
are made without clear proof that the company is so insolvent that a
receiver is necessary to prevent loss to creditors.2 4 Mere showing of
inability to meet obligations in the usual course of business does not
show need for a receiver. Should not the creditor be required to show
insolvency in the sense that the corporation does not have sufficient
property accessible to legal process to satisfy its creditors-especially
where the other creditors are eager to proceed by execution, or to fore-
close their security? A few courts have thought so,25 though the
majority of cases have required no such showing, either ignoring the
" Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935);
Davis v. Consolidated Coal Co., 41 Wash. 480, 84 Pac. 22 (1906); cf. Rogers v.
Bancokentucky, 18 Del. Ch. 23, 156 Atl. 217 (1931).
D CALIF. CODE (Deering, 1933 Supp.) §564; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton,
1929) §11894; N. J. Comp. STATS. (1925 Supp.) c. 47, §65.
"Parsons v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 4 N. J. Eq. 187 (1842) ; Wright v. American
Finance and Securities Co., 85 N. J. Eq. 181, 96 At]. 387 (1915).
'Gila Water Co. v. Witbeck, 29 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
2 Cassels Mills v. First National Bank of Gadsden, 187 Ala. 325, 65 So. 820
(1914); Dep't Store Co. v. Gaus-Langenberg Hat Co., 17 N. M. 112, 125 Pac.
614 (1912) ; Illinois Refining Co. v. Illinois Oil Co., 130 Okla. 27, 264 Pac. 904
(1928); cf. Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36, 48 Sup. Ct. 268, 72 L. ed. 457
(1928); Delaney Producing and Refining Co. v. Crystal Petroleum Products
Corp., 88 Cal. 784, 264 Pac. 521 (1928); Edison v. Fleckenstein Pump Co., 249
Mich. 234, 228 N. W. 705 (1930). North Carolina allows appointments on suits
of non-judgment.creditors even where debtor objects. Summit Silk Co. v. Kinston
Spinning Co., 154 N. C. 422, 70 S. E. 820 (1911).
2 Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbu'ry, 77 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935);
Illinois Refining Co. v. Illinois Oil Co., 130 Okla. 27, 264 Pac. 904 (1928) ; Davis
v. Consolidated Coal Co., 41 Wash. 480, 84 Pac. 22 (1906).
'Brenton and McKay v. Peck, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 224, 87 S. W. 898 (1905).
In Cassels Mills v. First Nat. Bank of Gadsden, 187 Ala. 325, 65 So. 820 (1914)
the court recognized the desirability of requiring such proof by petitioner, but held
it waivable.
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need for it entirely or tacitly assuming that it could have been made.
This burden of proof would not render it impossible for creditors to
demonstrate inadequacy of legal process in all cases where the fair value
of the debtor's assets exceeds its liabilities because experience demon-
strates that property brings less than its fair value on forced sale. Log-
ically it should be sufficient to show that when the debtor's assets are
assessed at their fair value the amount by which they exceed liabilities
is small in proportion to the total capital invested in the business, the
required margin varying directly with the amount so invested. 2 6 Too
real to be ignored is the difficulty of predicting precisely what a forced
sale may bring; but a fair degree of accuracy is possible and some
articulate attempt seems equitably indispensable. To the objection that
denial of receivership may precipitate a race of creditors it seems suffi-
cient to answer that unless the majority of creditors have joined in the
petition, if there is reasonable probability that all creditors may obtain
satisfaction by legal process such a race would be financially more satis-
factory than a too-expensive equity receivership.
PAUL F. MicKEY.
Statute of Frauds-Oral Contracts to Convey or Devise-
Part Performance-Damages.
The original English Statute of Frauds received no welcome in the
Court of Chancery. The statute was aimed at controlling the jury, and
Chancery had no jury. For nearly three centuries before the enactment
of the statute, the Chancellor had protected the vendee who had changed
his position in reliance upon an oral land contract,' by awarding him
specific performance. Hence the doctrine that part performance will
lift the bar of the statute.2
The rules regarding part performance, as they- have developed in
jurisdictions outside of North Carolina, are as variant as their results
are unpredictable. Uniformly, part payment is insufficient to remove
the bar of the statute.3 Roughly, the variations as to how much part
performance is sufficient to make specifically enforceable the oral con-
tract may be categorized as follows: (1) The English doctrine of posses-
'In Cook v. East Trenton Pottery Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 29, 30 Atl. 534 (1894)
the court said a margin of $50,000 for a corporation with assets of $550,000 would
be insufficient, though a $25,000 margin was adequate for a corporation having
assets of $65,000.
1 BARBOUR, History of Contract it Early English Equity, 4 OXFR STUDIES
IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (1914), parts reprinted in 2 Coox, CASES ON EQUITY(2d ed. 1932) 1-4.
'The statute of frauds was designed to prevent fraud and not to perpetrate
fraud. POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1926) §71.
'Purcell v. Coleman, 4 Wall. 513, 18 L. ed. 435 (U. S. 1866); Fulton v. Jan-
sen, 99 Cal. 587, 34 Pac. 331 (1893) ; Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24 (1869)
Sleeth v. Sampson, 237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355 (1923).
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sion.4 (2) Part payment plus possession. 5 (3) Possession and valuable
improvements.8 (4) The Massachusetts fraud rule :7 To allow the defend-
ant to rely on the statute after the plaintiff has acted on the faith of the
oral contract so that he would be irreparably injured would be to permit
the statute to be made an instrument of fraud. (5) The New York
rule:8 The acts of part performance must refer to the contract as al-
leged in the complaint. The purpose of this rule is to preserve the policy
of the statute which is considered more important than the hardship to
the plaintiff. The latter seems a determining factor under the Massa-
chusetts rule. This doctrine denies relief even though the plaintiff
would suffer a great hardship.9 (6) Acts of part performance must
be referable to a contract. 10 (7) Doctrine of part performance rejected
in its entirety."
' There are only a few square holdings on the point. In most of the cases the
facts reveal in addition acts other than the mere taking of possession. Buckmaster
v. Harrop, 13 Ves. Jr. 456, 6 Rev. Rep. 132 (1807); Neale v. Neale, 1 Keen
672 (1837) ; Miller v. Finlay, 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 510 (1861) ; Redden v. Jarmon,
16 L. T. Rep. N. S. 449 (1867); Bradley v. Loveday, 98 Conn. 315, 119 Ati.
147 (1922) ; Steenrod v. Wheeling Ry., 27 W. Va. 1 (1885).5 Townsend v. Vanderwerker, 160 U. S. 171, 16 Sup. Ct. 258, 40 L. ed. 383
(1895); Merrell v. Witherby, 120 Ala. 418, 23 So. 994 (1898); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS (1932) §197. Many states have the doctrine that either part pay-
ment or possession alone will not take the case out of the statute. That the
combination of these facts makes either of them more effective to create an equity
in favor of the purchaser is open to question. WALSH, EQUITY (1930) §78;
HANDLER, CASES ON VENDOR AND PURCHASER (1933) 30 points out that the Eng-
lish doctrine was adopted by the preliminary draft of the RESTATEMENTS OF CoN-
TRACTS (1932) §194, but that the final draft adopted the rule of possession plus
part payment.
6 Calanchini v. Branstetter, 84 Cal. 249, 24 Pac. 149 (1890); Andrew v. Bab-
cock, 63 Conn. 109, 26 AtI. 715 (1893); Cutsinger v. Ballard, 115 Ind. 93, 17
N. E. 206 (1888); Atkinson v. Akin, 197 Mich. 289, 163 N. W. 1024 (1917);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §197.
7 Burns v. Daggett, 141 Mass. 368, 6 N. E. 727 (1886). Pomeroy points out
that the reason for granting specific performance where the vendee cannot be
given adequate damages is to prevent fraud. POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1926) §104.
'Phillips v. Thompson, 1 Johns. Ch. 131 (N. Y. 1814) (The rule is clearly
stated, but language in subsequent cases makes doubtful whether the acts must
refer to the contract or merely a contract.) ; Wooley v. Stewart, 222 N. Y. 347,
118 N. E. 847 (1918) ; Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922) ;
Plunkett v. Bryant, 101 Va. 814, 45 S. E. 742 (1903); POMEROY, SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1926) 107n. §107, (2) ("If this were the true
rule, then the whole doctrine of enforcing a verbal contract which has been part
performed, would rest upon a most vicious reasoning in a circle, since the acts
of part performance would be relied on to prove the agreement, while their
character as acts of part performance would at the same time be proved by the
agreement.").
'Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922) (plaintiff gave
up his home and sold out his business in reliance upon the promise of defendant).
"Bradley v. Loveday, 98 Conn. 315, 119 Ati. 147 (1922).
=Dean v. Cassiday, 88 Ky. 572, 11 S. W. 601 (1889); Fox v. Stanford, 13
Smedes & M. 93 (Miss. 1849) ; Barnes v. Brown, 71 N. C. 507 (1874) ; Goodloe
v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 253, 92 S. W. 767 (1905).
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At first North Carolina 12 in Ellis v. Ellis'3 held that part perform-
ance would justify a decree of specific performance. The court argued
that if there were no valid contract the possession of the vendee made
him a trespasser and certainly the vendee could show he entered by
agreement in order to defend the action of trespass.14 Therefore, he
could show the same agreement for any other purpose. On rehearing
the court reversed itself and held that a conveyance should not be or-
dered because the court could not admit oral proof of the contract.' 5
Since this decision the court has consistently refused to decree specific
performance at the suit of either the vendee' 6 or vendor,lT though the
oral contract to convey has been partly performed.
Though his contract is unenforceable, the purchaser in North Car-
olina is not entirely without remedy. In the long course of decisions the
court has evolved a palliative which is usually fairly adequate. Where
the purchaser has paid the consideration to the vendor, he is entitled
to recover this.18 It would be inequitable to permit the vendor to keep
both the land and the consideration paid. Where the vendee enters and
makes improvements upon the property,' 9 he is entitled to recover the
"h North Carolina statute of frauds here involved is to be found in N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §988. For an earlier discussion of the problem treated
herein see (1922) 1 N. C. L. RFv. 48.
1316 N. C. 180 (1828) (The court took the position that no mischief could
arise from its construction of the statute since the doctrine of part performance
would be limited to those cases where the acts were unequivocally referable to the
contract.).1 The argument that the vendee would be exposed to liability for trespass is
without merit as the vendee is at least a tenant at will, Harris v. Frink 50 N. Y.
24 (1872), or a licensee, Drake v. Wells, 93 Mass. 141 (1865), and it would be
quite impossible for the vendor to hold him as a trespasser.
'Ellis v. Ellis, 16 N. C. 341 (1829).
""Allen v. Chambers, 39 N. C. 125 (1845); Plummer v. Adm'r of Owens, 45
N. C. 254 (1852); Barnes v. Teague, 54 N. C. 278 (1854); Ballard v. Boyette,
171 N. C. 24, 86 S. E. 175 (1915).
'7 Hall v. Misenheimer, 137 N. C. 183, 49 S. E. 104 (1904).
3S Chambers v. Massey, 42 N. C. 286 (1851) ; Murdock v. Anderson, 57 N. C. 77
(1858); Capps v. Holt, 58 N. C. 153 (1859); Barnes v. 'Brown, 71 N. C. 508
(1874) ; Smith v. Stewart, 83 N. C. 406 (1879) ; Wilkie v. Womble, 90 N. C. 254
(1863); Fortesque v. Crawford, 105 N. C. 29, 10 S. E. 910 (1889); Durham
Consolidated Land and Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N. C. 381, 21 S. E.
952 (1895) (If the vendor indicates to the vendee his willingness to convey, pro-
viding the vendee pays the balance on the purchase price, and the vendee delays
unreasonably in fulfilling such condition, the vendee cannot recover the money
he has paid because the defendant admits the contract. This is true even though
the vendor is presently unable to convey. The reason for the holding was based
upon the fact that it would have been unreasonable to require defendants to hold
their property in an unproductive state until it suited the pleasure of the plaintiffs
to make the first move.); Vick v. Vick, 126 N. C. 123, 35 S. E. 257 (1900);
Ford v. Stroud, 150 N. C. 362, 64 S. E. 1 (1909) ; Ballard v. Boyette, 171 N. C.
24, 86 S. E. 175 (1915) ; Carter v. Carter, 182 N. C. 186, 108 S. E. 765 (1921).
"The cost of the improvement to the vendee is immaterial. Daniel v. Crum-
pler, 75 N. C. 184 (1876) ; North v. Bunn, 128 N. C. 196, 38 S. E. 814 (1901);
Johnson v. Armfield, 130 N. C. 575, 41 S. E. 705 (1902).
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vendor's gain but not his (the vendee's) loss. 20  The vendor's gain is
the enhanced value of the premises by reason of the improvements.21
Were he not allowed to recover this the vendor would be unjustly en-
riched. If the vendor agrees to pay for the improvements placed upon
the land it is held that his promise is not invalid under the statute.22
For the time the vendee was in possession he must pay a reasonable
rent.23  This is determined by what the land would have rented for in
"Ellis v. Ellis, 16 N. C. 398 (1830) ; McCracken v. McCracken, 88 N. C. 273
(1882) (Where the vendor has no desire to use the improvements and is willing
for the vendee to remove them the vendee can recover nothing.) ; Jordan v. Fur-
nace Co., 126 N. C. 143, 35 S. E. 247 (1900) (If the premises have not been
improved the vendee can recover nothing, although he might have been Put to
considerable expense.) ; Chambers v. Massey, 42 N. C. 286 (1851) (The vendee
is entitled only to compensation for improvements made by him on the premises
before filing suit, or before he was informed that the vendor would not convey
the premises to him under the contract.) ; North v. Bunn, 128 N. C. 196, 38 S. E.
814 (1901); Johnson v. Armfield, 130 N. C. 575, 41 S. E. 705 (1902) (Nor is
he entitled to compensation for betterments placed on the land before the con-
tract to convey was made. A promise to convey after the improvements were
made could not have induced him to put them there. It is the inducement that
gives the equitable right to reimbursement for them.) ; Wood v. Tinsley, 138
N. C. 507, 51 S. E. 59 (1905) (The vendee can assert no equity against a subsequent
purchaser for value holding under a duly registered deed, and who bought even
with notice of the vendee's equity. In such a case the holder of the registered title
would have no record notice of the oral contract to convey.); Kivett v. Mc-
Keithan, 90 N. C. 106 (1883); Richmond & Danville R. R. v. Durham & North-
ern Ry. and Raleigh & Gaston R. R., 104 N. C. 658, 10 S. E. 488 (1889) (If the
plaintiff is a licensee, he is not entitled to compensation for the revocation of the
license.).
' Baker v. Carson, 21 N. C. 381 (1836); Albea v. Griffin, 22 N. C. 9 (1838);
Plummer v. Adm'r of Owens, 45 N. C. 254 (1852); Love v. 'Neilson, 54 N. C.
339 (1854); Winton v. Fort, 58 N. C. 251 (1859); Pitt, Adm'r v. Moore, 99
N. C. 85, 5 S. E. 389 (1887); Fortesque v. Crawford, 105 N. C. 29, 10 S. E. 910
(1889); Vann, Ex'r v. Newsom, 110 N. C. 122, 14 S. E. 519 (1891); Fields v.
Moody, 111 N. C. 353, 16 S. E. 239 (1892) ; Luton v. Badham, 127 N. C. 96, 37
S. E. 143 (1900) ; Kelly v. Johnson, 135 N. C. 647, 47 S. E. 674 (1904) ; Ford v.
Stroud, 150 N. C. 362, 64 S. E. 1 (1909) ; Ballard v. Boyette, 171 N. C. 24, 86
S. E. 175 (1915); Smithdeal v. McAdoo, 172 N. C. 700, 90 S. E. 907 (1916);
Ferrell v. Mining Co., 176 N. C. 475, 97 S. E. 386 (1918) ; Carter v. Carter, 182
N. C. 186, 108 S. E. 765 (1921) ; Perry v. Norton, 182 N. C. 585, 109 S. E. 641(1921); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Cordon, 208 N. C. 723, 182 S. E. 496
(1935).
'Houston v. Sledge, 101 N. C. 640, 8 S. E. 145 (1888) ; Ferrel v. Mining Co.,
176 N. C. 475, 97 S. E. 386 (1918). Were the agreement treated as a contract
to sell the improvements, it would seem the promise would be invalid unless
in writing. This is true as a contract to sell the improvements appears to be a
contract to sell an interest in land.
Albea v. Griffin, 22 N. C. 9 (1838); Chambers v. Massey, 42 N. C. 286
(1831); Capps v. Holt, 58 N. C. 155 (1859) ; Smith v. Stewart, 83 N. C. 406(1879); Fortesque v. Crawford, 105 N. C. 29, 10 S. E. 910 (1889); Durham Con-
sol. Land and Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N. C. 382, 21 S. E. 952 (1895) ;
Vick v. Vick, 126 N. C. 123, 35 S. E. 257 (1900) ; Luton v. Badham, 127 N. C.
96, 37 S. E. 143 (1900) ; Ford v. Stroud, 150 N. C. 362, 64 S. E. 1 (1909) ; Union
Central Life Ins. Co. v. Cordon, 208 N. C. 723, 182 S. E, 496 (1935); Hedge-
peth v. Rose 95 N. C. 42 (1886). Where the vendee goes into possession under
an oral contract to convey in consideration of companionship and support, the
vendor is entitled to rent only from the date of demand for possession, and not
from the time the vendee took possession. His contract in the inception was a
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its condition as the vendee received it.24 To allow the vendor rent on
the value of the improved land would be permitting him to profit by
repudiating the contract. Where the vendee is in pc.ssession and the
vendor brings ejectment, before he is entitled to relief the vendor must
first return the consideration paid and compensate the vendee for the
improvements placed upon the land.25
Where the vendor elects to recognize the oral contract to convey,
the vendee can not recover for improvements. In such a case the ven-
dee has no option, but must take a conveyance or nothing at all.26 The
contract is not void except at the instance of the party who is permitted
to and does plead the statute.
The vendee's recovery does not depend upon whether the vendor
admits or denies the contract. At one time, when the vendee sued for
specific performance, or in the alternative, the return of the considera-
tion and compensation for improvements, and the vendor denied the
contract and pleaded the statute of frauds, the vendee could recover
nothing, as the court would not admit proof of the contract when the
defendant denied it. However, if the vendor admitted the contract but
pleaded the statute the vendee could recover the consideration paid and
compensation for improvementsyr Under this doctrine the vendee's re-
covery depended merely upon the pleadings of the vendor. Fraudulent
practices would obviously result from such a rule and it is fortunate
that the rule has been abolished.28
gratuity and cannot be changed into a debt. The case is not analogous to one
in which a person enters into possession under an oral contract of purchase which
is later repudiated. There the transaction is a nullity, and the parties are put
in stat quo as far as may be. Defendants possession up to demand was not a
nullity, but rightful and legal, and as no compensation was to be given for the
use it cannot now be required.
Pass v. Brooks, 125 N. C. 129, 34 S. E. 228 (1899).
'Baker v. Carson, 21 N. C. 381 (1836) ; Albea v. Griffin, 22 N. C. 9 (1838);
Daniel v. Crumpler, 75 N. C. 184 (1876) ; Pass v. Brooks, 125 N. C. 129, 34 S. E.
228 (1899). A few cases merely give the vendee a lien on the premises for the
amount due him. Tucker v. Markland, 101 N. C. 422, 8 S. E. 169 (1888) ; Fields
v. Moodey, 111 N. C. 353, 16 S. E. 239 (1892) (no writ of possession issued until
payment by agreement of parties) ; North v. Bunn, 122 N. C. 766, 29 S. E. 776(1897).
Foust v. Shoffner, 62 N. C. 242 (1860) ; Green v. N. C. R. R., 77 N. C. 95
(1877); Syme, Adm'r v. Smith, Adm'r, 92 N. C. 338 (1884); Durham Consol.
Land and Improvement Co. v. Guthrie, 116 N. C. 383, 21 S. E. 952 (1895).
'Dunn v. Moore, 38 N. C. 364 (1844); Sain v. Dulin, 59 N. C. 196 (1862);
McCracken v. McCracken, 88 N. C. 273 (1882). Seemingly inconsistent with the
equitable rule is the fact that none of the cases controverts the vendee's right to
recover in a court of law whatever money may have been paid in furtherance
of the contract on his part. Dunn v. Moore, 38 N. C. 364 (1844).
'Luton v. Badham, 127 N. C. 96, 37 S. E. 143 (1900) (Justice Douglas dis-
senting at p. 104: No cases allow recovery for improvements where the vendee
has surrendered possession.) ; Love v. Atkinson, 131 N. C. 544, 548, 42 S. E.
966, 967 (1902) ; Ford v. Stroud, 150 N. C. 362, 365, 64 S. E. 1, 3 (1909) ; Perry
v. Norton, 182 N. C. 585, 588, 109 S. E. 641, 643 (1921).
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Where one orally contracts to convey or devise land in consideration
of services and later breaches the contract the vendee may recover the
reasonable value of his services if he has performed his part of the
agreement. 29 It is often difficult to ascertain the value of such services
and the relationship of the value of the land to the value of the services
presents a problem. The value of the land sheds some light on the ven-
dor's estimate of the value of the services and is admissible, but it is not
controlling. 0o
In Rednion v. Roberts3- suit was brought by an illegitimate child
against her father's estate for his failure to fulfill a promise to her
mother to leave plaintiff a share in his estate equal to that of his legit-
imate children in consideration of the mother's foregoing bastardy pro-
ceedings. The court by dictum stated the rule of damages would be
the value of the property agreed to be devised. The benefit to the intes-
tate could not be measured in money, and there appears to be no way to
determine the amount of recovery in such a case except by the standard
fixed by the parties to the contract. Such a rule when confined within
its proper limitations would unquestionably be a satisfactory method of
determining damages. Unfortunately, the rule was applied in Hager v.
Whitener3 2 where there was an action for damages for failure to devise
land in consideration of services. The doctrine should have no ap-
plicability in such a case as the value of the services can more easily
be computed. The court apparently has lately reverted to its former
position3 3 and now holds that the value of the land is merely some
evidence of the value of the services whether the action be either for
Whetstine v. Wilson, Adm'r, 104 N. C. 384, 10 S. E. 471 (1889); Andrews v.
Andrews, 122 N. C. 352, 29 S. E. 351 (1898); Lipe v. Houck, 128 N. C. 115, 38
S. E. 297 (1901); Tussey v. Owen, 139 N. C. 457, 52 S. E. 128 (1905); Fail-
cloth v. Kenlaw, 165 N. C. 228, 81 S. E. 299 ((1914) ; Patterson v. Franklin, 168
N. C. 75, 84 S. E. 18 (1915) ; McCurry v. Purgason, 170 N. C. 463, 87 S. E. 244
(1915); Deal v. Wilson, 178 N. C. 600, 101 S. E. 205 (1919); Hayman v. Davis,
182 N. C. 563, 109 S. E. 554 (1921) ; Perry v. Norton, 182 N. C. 585, 109 S. E.
641 (1921) ; Brown v. Williams, 196 N. C. 247, 145 S. E. 233 (1928) ; Grantham
v. Grantham, 205 N. C. 363, 171 S. E. 331 (1935) ; Lipe v. Trust Co., 207 N. C.
794, 178 S. E. 665 (193S); Norton v. McLelland, 208 N. C. 137, 179 S. E. 443
(1935).
' Faircloth v. Kinlaw, 165 N. C. 228, 81 S. E. 299 (1914) ; see Tussey v. Owen,
139 N. C. 457, 461, 52 S. E. 128, 129 (1905).
198 N. C. 161, 165, 150 S. E. 881, 885 (1929).
-204 N. C. 747, 169 S. E. 645 (1933). The court stated plaintiff was not suing
on quantum ineruit but was suing for breach of contract. If the action is for
breach of contract it is based upon the assumption that there is a valid contract,
and if the court assumes that, it is recognizing the agreement is valid at law but
not in equity. The contract is void according to the statute. The action should
be allowed only as in quantum ineruit.
'Hager v. Whitener, mipra note 33 has not been expressly overruled by sub-
sequent decisions. None of the later cases, however, have followed it. It may be
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damages3 4 or specific performance.3 5 If the plaintiff were permitted to
recover the value of the land without regard to the value of the services
the court would be practically allowing a recovery for breach of con-
tract void under the statute.
Thus it becomes apparent that the North Carolina doctrine has the
virtue of carrying into effect the actual purpose of the statute of frauds.
Unlike the many states which have departed from the letter of the statute
only to turn to an unpredictable doctrine of part performance, this state
has evolved a reasonably predictable course of action. But this policy,
as most others, has its disadvantages. Although in the ordinary run
of cases a quasi-contractual recovery for benefits conferred by the
purchaser is substantially adequate, in hard cases he will suffer from
it. For example, if in consideration of the vendor's promise to con-
vey land by will, the purchaser disposes of a profitable business enter-
prise and takes care of the defendant thereafter, his recovery is limited
to the value of the services performed. For the loss of the business the
purchaser in North Carolina is left "holding the bag."
C. C. BENNETT.
Suretyship-Property Surety.
Plaintiff signed her husband's note as accommodation surety, and
with the joinder of her husband executed a mortgage on her separate
property as security. On default, the mortgage was foreclosed and
the husband, with his own money, purchased at foreclosure sale. Held:
husband took no title for himself, the land being impressed with a con-
structive trust in favor of his wife as he owed the duty to indemnify
her as surety.'
Where one mortgages or pledges his separate property to secure
the debt of a third person, the courts are uncertain whether the property
pledged 2 or the owner of such property3 is to be called the surety. They
distinguished from later cases on the ground that the action was for breach of
contract, and not in quantum imeruit.
' Lipe v. Trust Co., 207 N. C. 794, 178 S. E. 665 (1935) ; Norton v. McLelland,
208 N. C. 137, 179 S. E. 443 (1935).
Grantham v. Grantham, 205 N. C. 363, 171 S. E. 331 (1933).
1 Speight v. Trust Co., 209 N. C. 563, 183 S. E. 734 (1936).
'it re Blanchard, 253 Fed. 758 (D. N. J. 1918) ; Price v. Reed, 124 Ill. 317,
15 N. E. 754 (1888); Gahn v. Niemcewicz, 11 Wend. 312 (N. Y. 1833); Hin-
ton v. Greenleaf, 113 N. C. 6, 18 S. E. 56 (1893).
' Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528, 12 Sup. Ct. 67, 35 L. ed. 843 (1891) ; Spear v.
Ward, 20 Cal. 659 (1862); Eberhart v. Eyre-Shoemaker, 70 Ind. App. 658, 134
N. E. 227 (1922); Matthews v. Matthews, 128 Me. 495, 148 Atl. 796 (1930);
Knight v. Whitehead, 26 Miss. 245 (1853) ; Stevens v. First Nat. Bank, 117 Okla.
148, 245 Pac. 567 (1926); Fowler v. Barlow, 102 Vt. 99, 146 AtI. 77 (1929);
Leffingwill v. Freyer, 21 Wis. 392 (1867).
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agree that the absence of personal liability will not prevent a principal-
surety relationghip. 4 It is sometimes stated generally that the property
surety occupies the same position as a personal surety.5 However, there
are situations where a personal surety would be liable but property
standing as surety would not, and vice versa. Thus, if a person sign
on the face of a negotiable note to accommodate the maker and add the
word "surety" after his signature, a binding extension of time by the
holder to the maker has been held not to discharge the surety under
the Negotiable Instruments Law, since he is a party "primarily" liable
and does not have the defenses available to a party "secondarily" liable
under Negotiable Instruments Law, §120, which defenses include a
binding extension of time.6 No such reasoning could operate to pre-
clude property standing as surety from being discharged, for such
property could not be called a "party" to the instrument, "primarily"
liable or otherwise. Again, in some jurisdictions, a married woman
cannot become a personal surety for her husband, but can hypothecate
her separate property on his behalf. 7 While a material alteration of the
instrument will discharge a personal surety thereon,8 a mortgage or
pledge given by a third party as security is not discharged where the
alteration was without fraudulent intent, as the mortgage will remain
good for the original debt of which the altered instrument was merely
evidence. 9
There are, on the other hand, many situations in which the law as
to personal and property surety is the same. Where the Negotiable
Instruments Law is not involved, the property so pledged or mortgaged
is released from the obligation by a binding extension of time without
the owner's consent,10 except where the creditor honestly believes that
the pledge security belongs to the debtor." A release of any additional
security held by the creditor will discharge the property standing as
surety to the extent of the prejudice to its owner. 12 Also, it appears
' Schiska v. Shramm, 151 Ore. 647, 51 P. (2d) 668 (1935).
1 BRANDT, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (3rd ed. 1905) §43; ROWLATT, PRIN-
CIPAL AND SURETY (2d ed. 1926) 8.
'Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907) ; see Rouse v. Wooten,
140 N. C. 557, 53 S. E. 430 (1906). But see BRANNON, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW (3rd ed. 1920) 313; 2 DANIEL, NwoTIAmz INSTRUMENTS LAW (6th ed. 1919)
§1312, n. 50.
7Goll v. Fehr, 131 Wis. 141, 111 N. W. 235 (1907) ; see 1 JONES, MORTGAGES
(8th ed. 1928) §149.
6 Neff v. Homer, 63 Pa. 327 (1869) ; Washington Finance Corp. v. Glass, 74
Wash. 653, 134 Pac. 480 (1913).
'Fowler v. Barlow, 102 Vt. 99, 146 Atl. 77 (1929); see Cheek v. Nail, 112
N. C. 370, 17 S. E. 80 (1893).
" Christner v. Brown, 16 Iowa 130 (1864) ; Hinton v. Greenleaf, 113 N. C. 6,
18 S. E. 56 (1893).
"See Eberhart v. Eyre-Shoemaker, 78 Ind. App. 658, 134 N. E. 227 (1922).
3'Van Hosen v. Gelfen, 103 N. J. Eq. 234, 143 Atl. 137 (1928); Leffingwell v.
Freyer, 21 Wis. 392 (1867).
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that the pledgor or mortgagor should have the same right as a personal
surety to give notice, either statutory's or under Pain v. Packard,14
that the creditor sue the principal debtor before resorting to the surety's
property. Or, he may file a bill in equity to compel the principal debtor
to exonerate him from liability by payment, provided no rights of the
creditor are thereby prejudiced. 1
The principal is precluded from acquiring good title to the surety's
property when the same is sold on foreclosure to satisfy the debt. Where
the debtor buys in, as in the principal case, equity will declare the pur-
chase void, 16 and impress the property with a constructive trust in
favor of the surety, since the debtor, by his attempt to purchase, is
merely paying a debt primarily his.17
0. W. CLAYTON, JR.
Taxation-Homestead Exemption.
Within the last three years the United States has witnessed a wide-
spread movement for legislation and constitutional amendments ex-
empting homestead property, in varying degrees, from taxation. The
exemptions have been effected in Florida,' Louisiana,2 Mississippi,3 and
Texas4 by exempting from taxes varying amounts of the assessed val-
2 N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §3967.1113 Johns. 174 (N. Y. 1816). After the debt is due surety may notify
creditor to sue principal; failure discharges surety to extent of his prejudice un-
der Pain v. Packard; entirely under the North Carolina statute. See Note (1928)
37 YALE L. J. 971 for states that have this doctrine by decision or by statute.
" Searcy v. Shows, 204 Ala. 218, 85 So. 444 (1920) ; Bearse v. Lebowich, 212
Mass. 344, 99 N. E. 175 (1912); Dobie v. Fidelity Co., 95 Wis. 540, 70 N. W.
482 (1897); see St. Croix Timber Co. v. Joseph, 142 Wis. 55, 124 N. W. 1049,
1052 (1910).1 Madgett v. Fleenor, 90 Ind. 517 (1883) ; see Perry v. Yarborough, 56 N. C.
66, 68, 69 (1856).
"Pond v. Wadsworth, 24 Ala. 531 (1854) ; McCollum v. Boughton, 132 Mo.
601, 34 S. W. 480 (1896) ; Perry v. Yarbrough, 56 N. C. 66 (1856).
1F.A. CONsT. art. X, §7a. The first $5,000 of assessed value in every home-
stead, urban or rural, land and buildings, exempt from taxation by state
and all local governments. Homesteads must be owned by heads of families who
are citizens of and reside in the state of Florida. "Provided that the title to said
'homestead may be vested in such head of a family or in his lawful wife residing
upon such homestead, or in both." Exemption effective 1934.
ILA. CoNsT. art. X, §4. The first $2,000 of assessed value in every homestead,
urban and rural, land and buildings, exempt from taxation by the state, all parishes,
all special districts, city of New Orleans, New Orleans School District, and New
Orleans Levee Board. Exemption effective only to the extent that replacement
revenues are provided. Homestead must be owned by the head of a family or
person having a person or persons dependent upon him. Exemption effective 1935.
Miss. LAws (1935) Ex. Sess. S. B. 20. The first $2,500 of assessed value in
every homestead, urban and rural, land and buildings, exempt from taxation by
the state. The quantity of land not to exceed 160 acres. Exemption effective 1935.
'TEx. CONST. art. VIII, §la. The first $3,000 of assessed valuation of all
"resident homesteads as now defined by law," not to exceed 200 acres, exempt
from taxation by state government.
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uation of such property. Minnesota 5 has provided for a lower assess-
ment rate up to the value of $4,000. West Virginia 6 provides a max-
imum tax rate of one per cent of assessed value, beyond which home-
stead property may not be taxed. In 1935 bills proposing constitu-
tional amendments allowing tax exemptions on homesteads were con-
sidered and rejected by the legislatures of at least thirty states. 7
Constitutional amendments giving the state legislatures discretionary
power to exempt homestead property to varying extents have been
adopted in Arkansas,8 North Carolina,9 New Mexico, 10 Oklahoma,"'
and Utah.12
In the November election, North Carolina approved an amendment
which gave the legislature power to exempt homesteads from taxation
up to a tax valuation of $1,000, but did not require the legislature to
grant any exemption at all. The property so exempted must be "held
and used as the place of residence of the owner." The word "owner"
is not defined. 13
At least five major problems might arise in North Carolina in con-
nection with the application of the homestead tax exemption.
1. It is exceedingly difficult to estimate the effect of homestead tax
exemption on the revenue of North Carolina counties and municipal-
MINN. LAWS (1933) c. 359. The first $4,000 of value in all hemesteads is
assessed at 25 per cent of full value, if platted or urban, and at 20 per cent if
rural or unplatted. Non-homestead property is assessed at higher percentages.
All governments in the state are affected. Effective 1934. The statute has been
held not unconstitutional as violating uniformity clause of the state constitution.
Apartment Operators' Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 191 Minn. 365, 254 N. W.
443 (1934). It was also held not unconstitutional as discriminating against non-
resident land owners. Logan v. Young, 191 Minn. 371, 254 N. W. 446 (1934).
"WeST VA. CoNsT. art. X, §1. Homesteads taxed at not more than 1 per cent
of assessed value, non-homestead property taxed at not more than 1.5 per cent
if outside of and at not more than 2 per cent if within, a municipality. Home-
stead -property must be the home occupied by the owner exclusively for residential
purposes, or farm occupied and cultivated by the owner or a bona fide tenant. This
exemption applies to all governments. Effective 1933.TAX BITS (now TAx PoLicy) April, 1935, p. 5.
8 ARK. CoNsT. amend. 23. Exemption of first $1,000 of assessed valuation
from state general property taxes and city taxes. Legislature given discretion
up to $2,500. Approved Nov. 3, 1936.
'N. C. CoNsT. art. V, §5; P. L. N. C. 1935, c. 444.
" N. M. CONST. art. VIII, §5. Up to the first $2,500 of assessed value of all
homesteads at the discretion of the legislature, exempt from taxation by apparently
all governments.
ONLA. CONsT. amend, adopted Sept. 24, 1935. The legislature is given
power to fix the limits of the homestead tax exemption. Having once acted, the
legislative enactment will be effective for twenty years and thereafter until re-
pealed, and the amount of exemption may be increased but not decreased. The
exemption affects all governments. For a discussion of the Oklahoma amend-
ment, see 14 TAx MAG. 79 (1936) ; Oklahoma Tax Commission, bull. no. 18.
1 UTAH CoNsT. art. XIII, §2. Up to $2,000 of value of all homesteads at the
discretion of the legislature, exempt from taxation by apparently all governments.
Approved Nov. 3, 1936.
' See note 9, supra.
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ities.14 A survey, conducted in nine North Carolina counties by local
officials and compiled by the Institute of Government, found that if the
full exemption of $1,000 should be granted, there would be an average
loss of approximately 14.31 per cent of the total tax valuation in those
counties.1 5 It is quite probable that the legislature will not grant the
maximum exemption at first, and if that be so, the corresponding loss
of revenue will, of course, be smaller. Poorer counties will probably,
on the average, suffer a greater percentage of loss in revenue than the
wealthier counties.
A survey was conducted by the Oklahoma Tax Commission to de-
termine the probable effect of the homestead tax exemption in that
state. The study, carried out in each of the seventy-seven counties in
Oklahoma, was made possible through the cobperation of the tax
assessor and other local officials in each county. It shows an average
reduction of 6.2 per cent in assessed valuation in all Oklahoma counties,
if the exemption is set at $500. At a $1,000 exemption the average
reduction is given at 10.1 per cent.16 These figures are admittedly
conservative. A noticeable fact is that the figures vary widely from
one county to another. Therefore the revenue in some counties would
be much more affected than in others. 17 In Kansas, when there was, a
discussion on the question, the Civic Research Institute made a study of
the effect of the proposals in that state and found that, at an exemption
of $1,500, counties would lose from 8 per cent to 54 per cent of their
total tax revenues, and municipalities would lose from 6 per cent to
70 per cent of their total tax revenues.' 8
2. Several perplexing legal questions will probably arise. The
question as to what constitutes ownership, for purposes of tax ex-
emption, is very difficult to determine. In Coombs v. People,l9 the
Illinois court said, "The word 'owner' as applied to land has no fixed
meaning which can be declared to be applicable under all circumstances
and as to any and every enactment. It usually denotes a fee simple
estate, but has been defined to include one who has the usufruct, con-
trol or occupation of land, with a claim of ownership, whether his in-
terest be an absolute fee or a less estate." Will the courts permit a
person holding a life estate in land to come under the exemption? Is
"For analysis of the economic effect in North Carolina, see POPULAR Gov'T,
9 GUIDEBOOK SERIES (Dec. 1936).
13 PoPtA Gov'T 17 (1936) ; 4 POPULAR GOVT 16 (1936).
Oklahoma Tax Commission, bull. no. 18, p. 12.
For a study of the effect of homestead tax exemption on the total tax to be
collected in Tuscaloosa C6unty, Alabama, see Alabama, University of. Bureau
of business research. Committee on government research. Studies of Legislative
Problems in Alabama. Mimeographed serv. no. 5, pt. 2.
'7Civic Research Institute, 114 West Tenth Street, Kansas City, Mo. The
Exemption of Homesteads from Taxation, December, 1935. Pp. 21, 25.
198 Ill. 586, 588, 64 N. E. 1056, 1057 (1902).
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a person the owner of the land who is in possession under a valid and
specifically enforceable contract to buy? Is the court going to consider
an equitable interest in the land as ownership? These questions will
have to await the decision of the North Carolina legislature and courts.
The act which creates the exemption, when it sets the amount of ex-
emption, should also define the terms used, specifying which elements
of ownership are to be required. Although the legislature cannot en-
tirely eliminate litigation on the question, it can materially aid the courts
by being as specific as possible in drafting the law.
Another legal problem which may arise in connection with the ques-
tion of ownership is whether a large land owner may increase his tax
exemption by conveying land to various tenants or to his children and
receiving purchase money mortgages in return. In that case the tenant
would be the record title owner, but usually would have little possibility
of paying for the land. The children would probably get the land
eventually anyway as the heirs of the land owner. In the case of the
tenants, the courts would probably require good faith on the part of the
landowner. In any event it would be a risky procedure; for example,
the land might greatly increase in value. The tenant could then resell,
pay off the mortgage and take a profit.
3. A problem that has been frequently litigated in Florida since
the passage of the homestead tax exemption law there concerns the
effect of the law on taxes levied for payments on governmental debts
incurred prior to the adoption of the amendment. It has been uniformly
held that the homestead tax exemption amendment is unconstitutional
in so far as it would jeopardize taxation for the payment of debts in-
curred prior to its adoption.20 The same result has been reached in
West Virginia.2 1 Discussing this question, the Florida court in Long
v. St. John22 said, "The newly exempted homestead property as well
as non-exempt property was taxable and subject to taxation when the
bonds were issued, and such homestead property continues to be tax-
able proportionately for such bonded debt purposes, until otherwise
lawfully provided by law, or the debt is satisfied; therefore such home-
stead property should be so assessed for such purposes, in the absence
of a valid law providing otherwise." The Florida Supreme Court in
two cases 23 has held that where new bonds were issued to refund old
bonds, it was simply a continuation of the old obligation and homestead
' State v. Carey, 121 Fla. 515, 164 So. 199 (1935) ; State v. Boring, 121 Fla.
781, 164 So. 859 (1935); State v. Port of Palm Beach Dist., 121 Fla. 746, 164
So. 851 (1935) ; Long v. St. John, 170 So. 317 (Fla. 1936).
SKeeny v. Kanawha County Court, 115 West Va. 243, 175 S. E. 60 (1934).
170 So. 317 (Fla. 1936).
'Folks v. County of Marion, 121 Fla. 17, 163 So. 298 (1935) ; State v. City of
Pensacola, 166 So. 851 (Fla. 1936) ; see also Boatright v. City of Jacksonville, 117
Fla. 477, 158 So. 42 (1934).
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property was still taxable for debt service. In each of these cases it
was stipulated in the resolution of the taxing unit which authorized
such refunding bonds that the property which was taxable at the time
of the issuance of the original bonds should continue to be taxed for
debt services on the refunding bonds. This stipulation was also re-
ferred to on the face of the refunding bonds. It was pointed out in
Folks v. County of Marion24 that the refunding bonds could not be sold
on the open market for the purpose of retiring the old bonds, but must
be exchanged, as a continuation of the old obligation. But it was held
in another case25 that homestead property could not be taxed for debt
service on refunding bonds which were executed prior to but delivered
to the bondholders subsequent to the effective date of the adoption of
the constitutional amendment. The court said that since there was no
stipulation that the same property, subject to taxation for the original
bonds, was to remain subject to taxation for the refunding bonds, the
constitution and laws in effect when such refunding bonds were issued
will control. Hence the homestead property was held exempt. The
United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the states by
legislation or constitutional enactments cannot impair prior contract
obligations. 26
4. Another problem arises as to the parties who have the right to
bring suit. Because of the lack of cases in other jurisdictions, Florida
will have to be consulted again to determine what has actually been
done. Litigants are naturally divided into two groups, i.e. those in
favor of including homestead property in assessments for tax purposes,
and those against such procedure. Usually the bondholder, because he
desires ample security for his bonds, and the county and municipality,
because they are interested in keeping the tax rate low, and in retiring
indebtedness, are the parties who favor the inclusion of homestead
property. In two Florida cases,27 bondholders were allowed to sue as
relators seeking writs of mandamus to have homestead property in-
cluded in a tax levy for the purpose of debt service on bonds. In each
case part of the bonds were in default and the bondholders alleged there
would be insufficient taxes raised if homestead property were not in-
cluded in the levy. A municipality 28 successfully sued the state to have
an issue of refunding bonds validated, so that the burden would not be
so great on taxpayers as it would be if the original bonds had to be paid
at their several maturities.
121 Fla. 17, 163 So. 298 (1935).
" Fleming v. Turner, 122 Fla. 200, 165 So. 353 (1935).
SNew Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 6 Sup.
Ct. 252, 29 L. ed. 516 (1885); see also U. S. CoxsT. ART. I, §10.
2 State v. Boring, 121 Fla. 781, 164 So. 859 (1935); State v. Port of Palm
Beach Dist., 121 Fla. 746, 164 So. 851 (1935).
State v. City of Pensacola, 166 So. 851 (Fla. 1936).
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On the other hand, an owner 29 of homestead property against which
a tax had been levied, seeking to escape taxation, brought suit in which
he joined the county tax assessor, county commissioners, an owner of
non-exempt property in the county, and a holder-owner of bonds of the
county, the latter two parties, members of large classes having a com-
mon interest in the subject matter of the suit, being made parties de-
fendant by order of the court for the purpose of representing those
classes. He alleged that there was sufficient non-homestead property
to provide the necessary tax moneys at a proper assessment, but was
unsuccessful on the merits. The court apparently assumed, without
discussion, that the parties were proper.
The state's attorney in Folks v. County of Marion,80 joined with a
homestead owner unsuccessfully to resist a suit brought by a county for
validation of refunding bonds. In North Carolina, if the Florida cases
are followed, at least three parties would be able to bring suit to deter-
mine whether homestead property should be taxed for payments on
bonded indebtedness incurred prior to passage of the exemption statute:
(1) a person owning and occupying homestead property; (2) a holder-
owner of county or municipal bonds in default; or (3) a county or
municipality, under authority of Consolidated Statutes 2492 (55-57),81
which gives a county or municipality the right to institute an action to
determine the validity of bonds or refunding bonds proposed to be is-
sued. These statutes do not permit actions to validate bonds already
issued. Possibly an owner of non-homestead property would have a
protectable interest because of the possibility of higher taxes.
5. The North Carolina Legislature very probably would be able, if
it desired, to grant a nearly unlimited exemption to homestead property
by means of the newly adopted classification amendment,3 2 which re-
quires only that taxation be uniform on each class of property taxed.
This could possibly be done by assessing homestead property at, say, 25
per cent of its true value. Hence, if homesteads had already been ex-
empted to the extent of $1,000, a homestead worth $4,000 would be
exempt entirely. The assessed value of the $4,000 homestead, at 25
per cent of its true value would be $1,000. Since we have assumed an
outright exemption of $1,000, the property would then be entirely ex-
empt from taxation. It is quite possible that the North Carolina Supreme
Court, perceiving the real intent of any such procedure, would hold any
such legislation unconstitutional as attempting to override the maximum
exemption set by the constitution. The legislature could probably enact
that homestead property over and above the outright exemption shall
be taxed at, say, one per cent, whereas other real property might be
Long v. St. John, 170 So. 317 (Fla. 1936).
tmSee note 24, supra. 11 N. C CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935).
N. C. CONsr. art. VII, §9; P. L. N. C. 1935, c. 248.
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taxed at two per cent. Under these circumstances a homestead assessed
at $3,000 would be exempt $1,000 by outright exemption. The tax on
the remaining $2,000 would be at one per cent rather than two per cent,
hence, in effect the total exemption of the homestead would be $2,000,
since homesteads would be taxed at one half the rate levied on pther
property. By reclassification the legislature could grant the substantial
equivalent of tax exemption on homesteads without using the home-
stead amendment. By this method, however, some rate of taxation,
however small, would have to be levied on homestead property over and
above the outright limitation; hence, all homesteads could never be
entirely exempt.
The purpose of the homestead tax exemption is to encourage home
ownership. The question whether this form of encouragement is
desirable may be waived. Suffice it to say that since the amendment
has been passed, the legislature will probably enact a law at the next
regular session fixing the amount of the exemption. Because of the
popular appeal of homestead tax exemption to the people, once the
legislature has granted an exemption, there is small likelihood of its being
diminished. The goal of the North Carolina legislature in setting the
amount of the exemption should be to set it at a point where it will help
the largest number of home owners, and at the same time will do the
least harm to county and municipal governments. Since a high ex-
emption would result in a serious impairment of the functions of local
government in some counties, it is submitted that the legislature should
grant a relatively small exemption at first to determine the effect on
municipal and county government incomes. Later the figure can be
set, on the basis of actual experience, at-the amount where it will do the
most good and the least harm. That figure is now problematical.
JAMES M. VERNER.
Taxation-Situs of Boats.
Plaintiff, a nonresident corporation, purchased certain boats from a
resident of defendant city, who had theretofore listed and paid personal
property taxes thereon to the defendant city. After the purchase of
the boats, plaintiff continued to use them on the sounds and rivers of
this state and the commonwealth of Virginia. Plaintiff did not remove
the boats to the state of its incorporation, but continued to return them
each week-end to defendant city. In plaintiff's action to recover per-
sonal property taxes paid under protest to defendant on said boats, held
the evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the question
whether the boats acquired a situs within the city for purposes of tax-
ation. Judgment was affirmed.'
1 Texas Co. v. Elizabeth City, 210 N. C. 454, 187 S. E. 551 (1936) (The opinion
does not state whether or not the boats were in defendant city on April 1, the tax
listing date.).
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The instant case is aptly illustrative of some of the difficulties which
confront the courts when they are called upon to settle matters of tax-
ation of personal property. The ancient rule expressed in the maxim
mobilia sequuntur personam, i.e., moveables follow the person, has in
modern times, because of the increase in the amount and variety of
personal property, yielded more and more to the law of the place where
the property is kept and used.2
The general rule in regard to boats is the same as that of other
tangibles,3 and it is usually held that a vessel is taxable at the domicile
of the owner unless it has clearly established another situs. 4
In its first decisions on the taxation of boats the United State Su-
preme Court held that the port of registry, i.e., the home port, was the
situs for taxation, unless the boat had clearly established An actual situs
elsewhere. 5 The more recent decisions have held that in the absence
of an actual situs that the boats are taxable not at the port of registry
but at the domicile of the owner.6 To acquire an actual situs it was
held that the boat must spend its time wholly within the "new" juris-
diction.7 In the most recent case on this question the court staunchly
held to the "domicile" rule, and even allowed the state of Kentucky to
tax ocean going boats belonging to a corporation of that state, although
the boats had never been in Kentucky, and because of their size could
never come there.8 This case illustrates the reluctance on the part of
the court to adjudge a taxable situs for boats other than that of the
owner's domicile.
The instant case is one of first impression in North Carolina. The
court stated, "The situs of personal property for purposes of taxation
'Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct. 876, 35
L. ed. 613 (1891) ; State v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 147 Minn. 339, 180 N. W.
108 (1920).
2 For a treatment of taxation of boats see: CooLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924)
§453; Fischer, The Doctrine of the Federal Courts as to the Situs of Personal
Property for Purposes of Taxation (1927) 13 ST. Louis L. Rav. 58, 60; Moore,
The Doctrbe of the Federal Courts as to the Situs of Personal Property for Pur-
poses of Taxation (1927) 14 VA. L. REv. 31, 37; Brandeis, The Listing and Asses-
sing of Property for County and City Taxes in North Carolina (1936) 3 POPOL"I
Gov'T 69, 74.
'Ayer and Lord Ice Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, 26 Sup. Ct. 679, 50 L. ed.
1082 (1906) ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 Sup. Ct. 13, 56 L. ed.
96 (1911); Norfolk and W. Ry. v. Board of Public Works, 97 Va. 23, 32 S. E.
779 (1899).
" Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 17 How. 596, 15 L. ed. 254 (U. S. 1855);
Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471, 21 L. ed. 303 (U. S. 1873); see Old Dominion
Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, 25 Sup. Ct. 686, 49 L. ed. 1059 (1905).
'Ayer and Lord Ice Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409, 26 Sup. Ct. 679, 50 L. ed.
1082 (1906) ; Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 Sup. Ct. 13, 56 L. ed.
96 (1911).
Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299, 25 Sup. Ct. 686, 49
L. ed. 1059 (1905).
Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 Sup. Ct. 13, 56 L. ed. 96
(1911).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
is ordinarily the domicile of the owner. Where, however, the owner
maintains said property in a jurisdiction other than that of his domicile,
in the conduct of his business within such jurisdiction, the situs of said
property for purposes of taxation is its actual situs, and not that of his
domicile."9
Stated in the abstract, the above sentence seems on its face to be in
accord with the federal cases. However, as used to explain the result
reached by the court, it appears to be a modification of the rule. Whether
the court thought the facts in the instant case distinguishable from the
federal cases, or whether the court was attempting to modify the rule
is purely conjectural. No explanation was given. With the result
reached there is no quarrel, but did the court mean that it is not neces-
oary for a boat to spend its time wholly within the new jurisdiction, or
did they mean that for all practical purposes the boats here involved
spent their time within this state? The opinion is far from being clear.
The court was deciding a federal question, and yet it referred in no way
to the federal decisions on the subject.
To support its decision the court cited one of its own recent cases
involving the taxing by a county of solvent credits of a nonresident
company.1° This case held that the property had acquired a "business
situs"11 in the county and was thus taxable there. The court by citing
this case attempted to draw an analogy between intangibles and boats.
This is the first time that the two have been compared so far as the
writer has been able to find. There are obvious differences between
boats and intangibles, and the problem of the situs of each is not the
same. The court does not explain the analogy.
The court in citing Johnson Oil Company v. Oklahoma12 draws an-
other analogy-this time between boats and "rolling stock." In this
case the court allowed Okahoma to tax a fleet of tank cars owned by an
Illinois corporation, but held that it could only tax the average number
of cars habitually within the state. In the instant case the plaintiff
made no objection to the amount of the assessment (which was for the
full value of all the boats), but contested solely the right of defendant
to tax the property at all. It would seem that the Johnson Oil Case
lays down an equitable rule in that it allows a state to tax that part of
the property that is actually used in the state. But in cases where the
cars were regularly within both states on the same days would they be
taxable in both states? Probably not. In no case should the propor-
9 Texas Co. v. Elizabeth City, 210 N. C. 454, 456, 187 S. E. 551, 552 (1936).
'" Mecklenburg County v. Sterchi Bros. Stores, 210 N. C. 79, 185 S. E. 454(1936).u For discussions of "business situs" see Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 56 Sup.
Ct. 773, 80 L. ed. Adv. op. 809 (U. S. 1936) ; Comment (1935) 4 FORDHAm L. Rv.
352.
"290 U. S. 158, 54 Sup. Ct. 152, 78 L. ed. 238 (1933).
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tionate amounts exacted by the various states total more than an assess-
nent of the whole. Double taxation is not unconstitutional, but there
is a disposition on the part of courts to disallow it.
Taxation of boats gives rise to three distinct situations: (1) Ocean
going boats-To tax these boats in states other than that of the owner's
domicile on any rule which used as its basis the time spent in the state
or miles which the boats traveled therein would obviously be impractical.
It is reasonable to assume that courts will continue to hold these boats
taxable at the domicile of the owner, since any other rule would not
enable a full assessment. (2) Boats spending a vast majority of time in
one state with very infrequent voyages to another-There are two pos-
sibilities here. The courts might continue to use the domicile rule, or
the boats might be taxable solely in the state where the overwhelming
majority of time was spent. The latter rule is the more reasonable be-
cause for all practical purposes the boat would be.said to have acquired
an actual situs in that state. (3) Where a boat spends vwst of its time
in one state, but visits one or more other states regularly-This is the
situation in the instant case. One possible result, other than the one
reached by our court, is that the state visited (Virginia in the instant
case) would be given a proportionate amount of the assessment worked
out on the principle of the Johnson Oil Case or some other similar rule,
using time or mileage in the state as the means of fixing an equitable
proportion. Or the courts might apply the domicile rule to this set of
facts. Where the boat visits several states other than the one in which
it spends the majority of the time, it is not likely that any of these
several states would share in the taxation because of the impracticability
of any such rule.
It is at least doubtful that the United States Supreme Court will
modify the domicile rule as laid down in its previous decisions. If it
does not, the instant decision cannot stand in so far as it conflicts with
that rule. No implication of a tendency toward modification can be
found in the opinions of the Supreme Court but in cases similar to the
instant one a strict application of the domicile rule would be inequitable.
A modification to some extent would be desirable.
HARRY LEE RIDDLE, JR.
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The January meeting of the Council of the North Carolina State Bar
will occur too late for inclusion of a summary of its proceedings in the
February issue of the LAW REVIEW.
